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Abstract 
In the last ten years, Russia’s growing assertiveness in international affairs has morphed into 
aggression as exemplified in Moscow’s military interventions first in Georgia in 2008 and 
subsequently in Ukraine in 2014. European countries responded to these events in markedly 
different ways. Whereas they decided not to implement sanctions against Russia in 2008, they 
reversed the non-confrontational course and sanctioned many of Russia’s top officials and a 
variety of businesses in 2014. This dissertation uses discourse analysis to investigate the 
motivations behind these contrary responses through the examination of French and German 
foreign policy rhetoric. I argue that explanations based on the realist expectations of balancing 
behavior, neoliberal institutionalist and liberal accounts highlighting the role of international 
institutions, and economic and other domestic interests, or constructivist explanations focusing 
on identity and international norms cannot fully explain French and German responses to 
Russia’s interventions. Rather, the reversal of their positions on sanctioning Russia can be traced 
to changes in the perceptions of the French and German policy makers regarding the state of 
democracy in Russia. Consistent with the logic of democratic peace research, I find that French 
and German policy makers refrained from taking confrontational action against Russia in 2008 
when they perceived it as an emerging democracy but were willing to confront Russia in 2014 
when they perceived it to be regressing into authoritarianism. Theoretically, this dissertation 
demonstrates the importance of perceptions of the target regime, specifically with respect to the 
democratic peace theory, and suggests that these interpretations apply also to the trajectory of 
domestic politics in the target state. It expands the scope of democratic peace theory to include 
transitioning states and argues that democratic foreign policy is not limited to the dyads of 
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mature democracies but can also be applied to situations when the target state is perceived to be 
moving on a path toward western-style liberal democracy.  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Motivating Question and Plan for the Dissertation 
On 8 August 2008, Russia launched a large-scale land, air, and sea invasion of Georgia shortly 
after the Georgian Army attacked ethnic Russian separatists in the city of Tskhinvali, the capital 
of South Ossetia, a breakaway province of Georgia. Russian and South Ossetian forces defeated 
the Georgian military in a matter of days in what the Russian government dubbed as a “peace 
enforcement operation”. Responding to the Russo-Georgian hostilities, French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy, who held at that time the rotating presidency of the European Union, negotiated a 
cease-fire between Moscow and Tbilisi. On 26 August 2008, then-Russian President Dmitry 
Medvedev signed a decree recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, another 
breakaway region of Georgia. With Russian support, the two territories remain outside Georgian 
jurisdiction as de facto independent countries. While European countries universally expressed 
disapproval of Russia’s actions, they took little concrete action, specifically rejecting the 
implementation of sanctions. The only response was to suspend negotiations between the EU and 
Russia on a renewal of their Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). Bilateral relations 
between Russia and the majority of European states continued unabated however. 
Subsequently, in the wake of Ukrainian regime change in February 2014 that replaced a 
pro-Russian president with a pro-western one, the Crimean parliament sought greater 
independence from the central government. After failing to obtain their desired autonomy, the 
Crimeans voted to become independent from Ukraine proper. In March 2014 Russian troops 
occupied Crimea in support of secessionist elements, resulting in the eventual annexation of the 
peninsula that had been part of Ukraine since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Soon after, ethnic 
Russians in the eastern provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk also sought independence from the 
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central government and began seizing control of these territories. While Russia did not overtly 
assist these new self-proclaimed republics, they supported the rebels through the provision of 
equipment and personnel. Furthermore, Russia kept up to 40,000 soldiers adjacent to the Ukraine 
border for several months in a clear signal to the Ukrainian government not to take aggressive 
action against the separatists. As a result of the annexation of Crimea and the continuing support 
for instability in Ukraine, France and Germany responded to Russian intervention by supporting 
European sanctions on certain individuals in Russian and Ukraine and sectors of the Russian 
economy. 
Both instances are cases of Russian military intervention in domestic political conflicts in 
sovereign states, which resulted in their territorial disintegration. In both cases, Russia acquired 
formal or informal but de facto control over the breakaway regions. However, key European 
nations—France and Germany particularly—responded to Russia’s actions differently, despite 
the markedly similar international and domestic contexts for foreign policy making in these two 
democratic states. Why did France and Germany reject sanctions against Russia following its 
intervention in Georgia but then support their implementation in the case of Russia’s aggression 
in Ukraine? The disparate reactions of these two European nations form the subject for this 
study. On a broader theoretical level, the dissertation seeks to deepen the understanding of the 
sources of democratic foreign policy.  
Through in-depth comparative case studies of French and German foreign policy, 
including discourse analysis of official rhetoric of the French and German governments toward 
Russia’s military interventions, this research will test alternative explanations of democratic 
foreign policy informed by the mainstream theoretical approaches to international relations 
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(realism, liberalism, and constructivism). It will show that neither state interest in security-
maximization nor other pragmatic considerations consistently account for the foreign policies of 
these democratic states. Constructivist approaches emphasizing culture, identity, and 
international norms likewise fail to provide a full explanatory picture.  
In line with the democratic peace theorists, this dissertation will argue that regime type, 
more specifically a democracy, predisposes a state to particular foreign policy actions toward 
other democracies. Unlike much of the democratic peace research, this thesis will further show 
that democracies’ perceptions of target states more than objective indicators of democracy 
motivate decision makers to enact distinctly different policies.  Moreover, these actions reflect an 
interpretation of a regime’s political trajectory, i.e., whether it is moving toward or away from 
becoming democratic. Specifically, I contend that the change in the French and German foreign 
policy toward Russia’s intervention can be accounted for by the differences in French and 
German government’s perceptions of Russia’s progress or decline in movement toward accepted 
democratic standards. In 2008, France and Germany understood Russia to be a democratizing, if 
not already democratic, state and chose to forego support for sanctions. However, by 2014, these 
states had ceased to consider Russia in these terms, allowing them to endorse European 
sanctions. What these findings suggest is that the democratic peace logic rests not only on the 
presence or absence of certain institutions but also on whether leaders in democratic countries 
interpret their presence or progress toward creating them. 
The research in this paper focuses on French and German positions on sanctions with the 
acknowledgment that the ultimate decision to apply sanctions or not is a result of collective 
bargaining within the EU.  Economic sanctions are not the province of any particular country but 
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rather emerge as a result of multilateral negotiations under the auspices of the EU.  Institutional 
voting rules require broad agreement for policy decisions and cannot rest solely on the 
preferences of a limited number of countries. Consequently, EU decisions to abstain from or 
implement sanctions are not exclusively the result of German and French preferences.  On the 
contrary, it is feasible to enact policies without the support of either of these states.  At the same 
time, both of these states are acknowledged leaders within the Union, to the extent that their 
status has been described as “embedded bilateralism” (Krotz and Schild, 2013) and their 
agreement with each other is usually necessary to achieve multilateral agreement.  For instance, 
France and Germany diverged on whether the EU ought to take collective action in Libya in 
2011, which prevented a coordinated response (Miskimmon, 2012).  While other 
conglomerations of countries exert collective influence at times, other member countries 
diverged from the shared Franco-German perspectives with respect to Russian interventions.  
Both the United Kingdom, as part of the “Big Three,” and Poland, a member of the Weimar 
Triangle, frequently act in concert with France and Germany.  However, each of these countries 
favored sanctions in response to both crises (Freeman, 2008 notes both the British and Polish 
desire for tougher response to Russia).  Therefore, based on their leading roles within the EU and 
observed differences over time, France and Germany provide a suitable representation of the 
concerns that motivated the differences in the broader institutional decisions.  
The rest of the dissertation proceeds as follows. First, I provide a brief summary of key 
events from the conflict years. Next I review the theoretical foundations for analyzing foreign 
policies. Building on those foundations, I develop a number of plausible, theoretically-informed 
explanations for French and German foreign policy behavior. Subsequently, I review the 
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discourse analysis methodology and summarize the data collection approach and the data used 
for testing the study’s hypotheses. The next chapters focus on applying discourse analysis to the 
two case studies, first the French and then the German, in order to evaluate the theoretical 
explanations of these country’s foreign policies. Finally, I provide a summary and combined 
conclusions. 
Action and Reaction: Russian Interventions and European Responses 
Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia and Russia’s intervention in Ukraine are instructive for 
comparative analysis of democratic states’ responses to intervention. These two cases provide a 
rough control along important dimensions. First, both target states are former Soviet republics 
beset by internal political unrest based on ethnic minorities that have appealed to Russia for 
support against the existing internationally recognized regime.  Furthermore, each state 
contained a significant faction committed to greater integration with Europe and the west in 
general.  In addition, the pattern of Russian response in each case matches the other, i.e., when 
internal political disorder resulted in violence, Russia intervened in defense or support of 
separatist groups, despite objections from the host nation.  While significant differences also 
exist, particularly in the size of each respective country’s territory, population, and economy, 
these do not detract from the validity of the comparison. 
The Russo-Georgian war 
Russian air and ground forces crossed into South Ossetia on 8 August 2008 in response to 
Georgian military operations previously undertaken in that breakaway region. The Russians 
justified their intervention on a humanitarian basis, arguing that they were responding to 
Georgian ethnic cleansing or genocide of ethnic Ossetians. For its part, Georgia had attacked into 
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South Ossetia in order to “restore constitutional order” following attacks on its Georgian security 
forces by South Ossetian forces (International Crisis Group, 2008). After three days of fighting, 
Russian forces had driven Georgian army out of South Ossetia proper and continued into 
Georgia proper, i.e., areas that had not previously been part of the internationally recognized 
territory of South Ossetia. At the same time, Russian forces had enabled fighting in the other 
separatist republic, Abkhazia, and begun both land and sea operations against Georgia. Russian 
actions once again extended beyond the boundaries of the separatist region into acknowledged 
Georgian territory. Their ships interdicted operations at the port of Poti, Russian planes bombed 
the Georgian city of Gori, and their troops occupied significant amounts of land in western 
Georgia in and around that city. Although Georgia had declared a unilateral ceasefire on 10 
August 2008, Russia continued to expand its presence until 12 August, creating what it deemed 
“buffer security zones.” (Felgenhauer, 2009) 
In response, French President Nicolas Sarkozy drafted a ceasefire proposal to restore 
peace and ultimately to arrive at an international solution to the status of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia. From 12-14 August, Sarkozy and his Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner, visited 
both Russia and Georgia to present the plan and obtain their concurrence. After some minor 
edits, the agreement was signed, which consisted of six clauses. Among these was the 
requirement for Russian forces to withdraw to their positions prior to the outbreak of conflict, 
with the condition that Russian peacekeeping forces could implement additional security 
measures while waiting on “an international mechanism.” Given its ambiguity, this point led to 
differing interpretations and continued tension between Russia and Europe through October, 
when Russia finally pulled back from its self-proclaimed buffer security zones. 
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In the meantime, Russia took an even more controversial step in recognizing the 
independence of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Once again European leaders vehemently 
opposed this step and threatened retaliation and  called an emergency session of the EU Council 
to discuss both the unilateral recognition of the breakaway republics and Russia’s continued 
occupation of Georgia. At first, talk of sanctions came from a range of states including France, 
the UK, and Poland, although the focus was on diplomatic sanctions such as suspending Russia 
from the G8 or withholding support for Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
rather than economic sanctions. Declining to initiate sanctions against Russia, the EU chose to 
postpone future discussions regarding a new EU-Russia partnership agreement until Russia 
withdrew its forces. On the other hand, individual countries quickly reestablished bilateral 
interactions with Russia. For example, Germany held intergovernmental discussions at the 
beginning of October, 2008. Chancellor Angela Merkel implicitly admitted that Russia had not 
fully implemented its agreed-upon actions in saying that the six-point plan is being worked out 
“step-by-step” but felt that the best way forward would be continued engagement (Office of the 
Chancellor, 2008). Frustration with Russian influence in the separatist republics remained into 
the new year and beyond but never amounted to concrete action. 
Multiple crises in Ukraine 
Beginning in late 2013, dissatisfaction with the existing government led Ukrainians to call for 
the removal of President Yanukovich. The impetus behind the protests came from the president’s 
cancellation of a trade deal with the European Union and agreement to accept economic help 
from Russia instead. These protests eventually led to the departure of the president and the 
appointment of a new pro-Western government in February 2014. On 27 February, unidentified 
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gunmen seized government buildings in Crimea, and soon after similar elements moved to secure 
airports and other infrastructure on the peninsula (Higgins and Erlander, 2014). Responding to an 
appeal from the Crimean prime minister for assistance in safeguarding the area, the Russian 
parliament authorized military intervention in both Crimea as well as the rest of Ukraine on 2 
March. Due to the presence of the Russian Black Sea fleet and associated military bases at 
Sevastopol, Crimea already contained a significant amount of Russian forces who were tasked 
with assisting local security forces in maintaining “security” on the peninsula, citing concerns 
about protecting ethnic Russians “from chaos and disorder” (Smale and Erlanger 2014). In early 
March, the Crimean parliament voted to secede from Ukraine with an eye toward becoming part 
of Russia (Herszenhorn, 2014) and set a date for a referendum to be held on 16 March for the 
people to express their preference between remaining part of Ukraine, albeit with greater 
autonomy, or becoming a part of Russia. Not surprisingly, the official results overwhelmingly 
favored the latter option, which were reported to show 97% of the population in favor 
(Herszenhorn and Cowell, 2014), although western observers noted that the presence of Russian 
troops may have influenced the vote, which was immediately condemned as illegal and 
destabilizing (Obama 2014; Hoyle 2014, DeYoung and Witte 2014). Russia proved eager to 
embrace the apparent decision of the Crimean people and dutifully annexed the peninsula the 
following day (White, 2014). 
Russia’s support for secession and subsequent annexation deeply concerned western 
leaders. Each step of the process elicited strong reactions from European statesmen who objected 
to what they saw as violations of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. In response to 
the Crimean referendum, the European Union implemented travel restrictions against over 
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twenty Russian and Ukrainian officials whom European states believed to be responsible for 
violations of international law in Ukraine. Soon after, the actual annexation of Crimea led to 
further sanctions against additional individuals. 
Russian involvement in Ukraine did not end with the annexation of Crimea; rather, it 
remained robust throughout the remainder of 2014. Many ethnic Russian in the eastern half of 
the country were unhappy with the change in Ukrainian leadership and its western orientation, 
leading to unrest and calls for greater autonomy at least, if not secession, as seen in the self-
declared Luhansk Peoples Republic. Russia denied any presence of its military forces in Ukraine, 
although western European countries and the United States contended otherwise. Nevertheless, 
Russian support for uprisings in eastern Ukraine was undeniable. At the very least, in April 2014, 
40,000 Russian ground troops remained deployed just over the Ukrainian border in the Russian 
regions of Belgorod, Kursk, and Rostov, sending a message to Ukrainian officials that Russia 
was prepared to respond, just as they had in Crimea, to appeals from the Russians inside Ukraine 
for assistance, ostensibly for humanitarian purposes (Myers and Smale, 2014). While the number 
of troops eventually decreased, the Russian presence just across the border remained more 
significant than before the conflict. Furthermore, Russia provided support within the separatist 
republics in the form of both personnel and equipment.  Despite Russian denials, NATO officials 
provided evidence of materiel within Ukraine that could not have belonged to the Ukrainian 
military and therefore had to have come from Russia (Lander and Gordon, 2014).  The West also 
accused Russia of sending troops to support rebels under the guise of humanitarian relief, which 
they condemned as a violation of international law since the aid had not been requested or 
approved by the government in Kiev (Demirjian and Birnbaum 2014). Finally, western states 
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held Russia accountable to various degrees in the shooting down of a civilian aircraft, Malaysia 
Air flight MH17. The missile was certainly Russian-made. While Russian soldiers most likely 
did not fire it, Russia must have provided the system to whomever attacked the plane and most 
likely provided training on its employment (Dutch Safety Board, 2015; Gude and Schmid, 2014; 
Miller, 2014). Russian culpability came from the fact, as German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier stated, that “Russian leadership has not done enough to stop the separatists 
(Steinmeier 2014d). 
Russia’s continued involvement in Ukraine led to tangible reactions on the part of the 
United States and European countries, which firmly believed that Russia was contributing to the 
instability of the political situation and the escalation of military conflict in Ukraine . Beginning 1
in mid-March with restrictions on a limited number of individuals in response to the annexation 
of Crimea, the European Union continued to add names to the list to sanctioned individuals.   On 2
15 April, the EU expanded sanctions to those whom it believed had misappropriated Ukrainian 
funds (Council of the European Union, 2014). Due to continued fighting and instability in 
eastern Ukraine, additional measures were agreed upon on 12 May 2014. In addition, the other 
members of the G8 decided to postpone Russian participation in the group, cancelling the 
scheduled meeting in Sochi, Russia and moving it to Brussels. Finally, NATO likewise cancelled 
previously planned high-level staff talks with their Russian counterparts. European attitudes 
toward Russia continued to sour as 2014 progressed, with continued fighting and the shoot-down 
 While not always concurrent and of equal extent, US and European sanctions generally followed a 1
similar, gradual process of increasing severity.  As one official stated, “"It's a little bit of a yin-yang 
[relationship]," one senior official said concerning US and EU punitive measures against Russia over 
Ukraine. "At times we're catching up with them, at times they're catching up with us" (LaFranci, 2014).
 A timeline of EU sanctions is available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-2
crisis/history-ukraine-crisis/
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of MH17. Perceiving Russian recalcitrance, the EU continued to increase the depth of sanctions  3
against Russia, eventually moving beyond individuals to include companies in specific 
industries, including those in the energy sector to which European nations had previously felt 
vulnerable. 
As these brief reviews of the conflicts highlight, similar cases of Russian interventions 
led to different reactions in each instance on the part of European countries.  The rest of the 
dissertation investigates the reasons for the contrasting foreign policies on the part of France and 
Germany, two leading European states.  The analysis of these decisions closely relates to 
evaluation of international relations and stems from the same theoretical bases, which are 
reviewed below.   
Theoretical Foundations 
What is foreign policy? 
As a field of scholarly inquiry, the comparative study of foreign policy has been defined by a 
search for theoretical accounts of policies and actions of national governments that are oriented 
toward the external world. Comparative method has been central to the analysis of the sources of 
states’ foreign policy in this area of research. In contrast to the broader field of international 
relations, foreign policy analysis explicitly advocates considering multiple levels of analysis as 
well as a combination of a range of factors in explaining states’ foreign policy choices (Neack, 
Hey and Haney, 1985; Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 2004; Neack 2008; Hudson 2014).  
It is important to note that there are at least two distinct areas of comparative foreign 
policy analysis. One is the study of the factors behind particular foreign policy outcomes. This 
 Additional EU sanctions imposed on 16 and 25 July as well as 28 November.3
!11
type of research examines a particular policy choice and attempts to explain the motivations 
behind one choice rather than another, what could be called the “what” and “why” questions. 
Another type of inquiry into states’ foreign policies focuses on the process through which a 
particular decision was made or the process of foreign policy decision-making. These studies 
emphasize the “how” aspects of arriving at a particular decision. In this study, I will focus on 
explaining foreign policy outcomes, not the decision-making process, by France and Germany. 
For analytical purposes, the diverse explanations of states’ foreign policy choices can be 
classified along two dimensions: (1) the primary locus of foreign policy motivations—external or 
internal; and (2) the source of these motivations—rational/material or normative. Table 1 
presents a summary of the mainstream theories of foreign policy classified along these 
dimensions.  4
At the highest level, predominant theories of international relations and foreign policy 
diverge from each other based on competing assumptions pertaining to goals pursued by 
countries (material interests vs. normative concerns) and the source of these objectives (internal 
vs. external).  Realists, neoliberal institutionalists, and liberals argue that states are rational actors 
whose interests are purely material, but these theorists disagree on the source of priorities.  
Realists and institutionalists contend that interests are exogenously determined and common 
among states; whereas liberals assert that interests are endogenously determined, the result of the 
 Foreign policy theories are not identical to those of international relations but they are related and built 4
on the same foundations.  Some scholars have strenuously asserted that the two have nothing to do with 
each other such as Waltz (1979, 1996) who famously claimed that his theory of international politics 
“does not tell us why state X made a certain move last Tuesday.” (Waltz 1979: 121) Others (Hoffman, as 
quoted by Waver 2003: 28) have tried but struggled to unify them.  At the same time, many scholars note 
the link between them.  Fearon (1998: 289) argues that “an important and natural way that [international 
relations and foreign policy] are the same.”   Modifying that claim slightly one scholar makes the 
distinction that “IR is interaction; Foreign Policy is action” (Rittberger, 2004)
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preferences of dominant social actors.  Alternatively, constructivists see state action motived by 
normative considerations with similar distinctions between the sources of state goals.  Structural 
constructivists maintain that state action is influenced by its desire to comply or enforce 
international norms.  Finally, domestic constructivists claim that state interests are based on 
internal characteristics which then dictate the pursuit of particular policies.  In the section below, 
I explain each of these theories in greater detail, highlighting the connections between 
international relations and foreign policy and reviewing previous research related to French and 
German foreign policies specifically.  These perspectives also form the basis for developing 
potential explanations of the two cases under consideration and provide the theoretical 
underpinnings for discourse analysis.  
“Mainstream” theoretical explanations of states’ foreign policy 
Neorealism offers a wide variety of explanations of states’ foreign policies. Nevertheless, they all 
begin with the assumptions shared by all variants of political realism. First, neorealists view the 
international system as anarchical and states as primary actors of international politics. States are 
!13
Table 1 — Theoretical Bases of Foreign Policy Motivations
Source of Foreign Policy Motivations





















assumed to be unitary and rational actors pursuing their own interests defined in terms of power 
or security. Being inherently self-centered and surrounded by like-minded units, states cannot 
rely on each other for their own security, resulting in a self-help system. All states are 
functionally alike, but they differ in terms of the material capabilities that determine their ability 
to pursue their self-interest along with the nature of polarity of the international system. 
From the realist perspective, therefore, states are expected to respond to a threat (or a 
perception of one) or merely to a change in the distribution of power in the international system 
that they translate into a security threat. According to the “father” of neorealism, Kenneth Waltz, 
states will engage in balancing behavior to prevent the emergence of a hegemon (Waltz, 1979). 
The internal balancing entails building up material capabilities while the external balancing 
involves making alliances. States in this perspective are concerned with relative rather than 
absolute gains.  Therefore, when a state in the system begins to increase its power relative to 
others, upsetting an existing balance, other states within the system will react to restore the 
balance. While Waltz and later neorealist scholars suggested that states merely react to changes 
in the distribution of power in the international system, Mearsheimer (2001) argued that states 
can never be sure that they are secure and therefore must continue to pursue advantages until 
they become the hegemon. Furthermore, others (Walt, 1987) have asserted states seek to balance 
threats rather than power, suggesting that factors such as aggressiveness, offensive capability, 
and geography impact a state’s reaction to another’s increase in power. 
A state’s relative power, therefore, is one of the key factors that explains foreign policy 
choices from a neorealist perspective. In other words, foreign policies are a function of the 
number of poles in the system and the capabilities of a particular state. Naturally, small states 
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have fewer options than larger states. In the anarchic international system, however, all states 
will pursue policies that protect their autonomy within or enhance their ability to influence the 
system. French and German alignment with Russia against the American-led invasion of Iraq in 
2003 could be explained from this perspective. Conceivably, the United States’ willingness to act 
unilaterally in Iraq despite the objections of European countries was a threat to the existing 
systemic conditions. A victory over an adversary (Iraq) and the addition of another (presumed) 
ally would make the US even more powerful than it already was. In addition, American 
dominance over Iraq would increase its influence in the middle east, giving it the ability to have 
even greater impact on events in the region in particular regarding energy security and Iran’s 
nuclear program.  Therefore, in response states took action to reduce American power and 
influence by aligning together in opposition. 
Prior research on European foreign policy has explained French and German decisions 
from the realist perspective. To many observers of French politics (Bucher et al. 2013; Simón 
2013a, 2013b; Gomart 2007; Larsen 2012), French actions in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century reflect realist concerns with changes in power distribution within the international 
system. France invests significant effort in maintaining political influence in Europe and beyond 
in order to establish and maintain regional and global multipolarity. In response to a unipolar 
international system dominated by the United States, France has pursued foreign policies aimed 
at countering American hegemony. French support for European integration stems from its desire 
for Europe to be one center of power in a multipolar world (Bucher et al., 2013). In another 
instance, as German economic power increased, France took actions to counter this change in the 
distribution of power, albeit economic. Strengthened Franco-Russian ties are seen as a way to 
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counteract American and German influence in Eastern Europe, just as alignment with Germany 
and Russia against the US with respect to Iraq was designed to counteract the growing power of 
the US. Similarly, research on Germany highlights the influence of material factors in 
determining German foreign policies. Stephen Szabo (2014) asserts that German policies are a 
result of commercial realism and that geo-economic factors have driven relations between 
Germany and Russia. 
Neoclassical realists reject one of the foundational assumptions of the neorealist 
perspective. Accepting assertions regarding anarchy, a focus on survival, and states as rational 
actors, these scholars (Rose, 1997; Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro, 2009) suggest that 
consideration of systemic conditions is not enough to account for international behavior. Rather, 
it is necessary to incorporate domestic influences on foreign policy choices. Changes in relative 
power are not deterministic; rather, they open possibilities for certain foreign policy actions. At 
the same time, internal considerations impinge upon decision-making and therefore create “an 
imperfect transmission belt” through which systemic imperatives are translated (Lobell et al., 
2009: 4). State reactions to international events are constrained by factors such as a lack of 
consensus among decision makers regarding the international context or the domestic political 
environment. Elite perceptions of threats or competing prioritization of national interests may 
lead to contrasting ideas of how best to respond to changes in the environment. If decision 
makers feel that a policy would damage future political prospects, they will decide to pursue a 
course of action contrary to what pure system dynamics would demand. This is not to say that 
material factors no longer predominate or that preferences of substate actors determine interests 
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as in liberal theory. Rather, the systemic assumptions remain but domestic factors play a 
mediating role causing deviation from expected behavior based purely on systemic impulses. 
From this point of view, French and German foreign policy choices can be explained by 
considering factors linked to a variety of domestic circumstances. Increasing Russian 
assertiveness should have led to regional balancing by Germany and France according to purely 
structural thinking, but this is not what occurred. Rather than automatically responding to 
changes in the balance of power, policy makers in these states considered other issues such as 
energy security, shared security interests (e.g., counter-terrorism and operations in Afghanistan), 
and regional security dynamics. The former reflects the domestic concern with reliable sources 
of hydrocarbons while the others demonstrate that more urgent, pragmatic considerations 
mitigate decisions based purely on changes in relative capabilities. 
The literature offers several analyses of the French and German policy choices informed 
by the premises of the neoclassical realist approach. Reflecting a priority of regional over global 
concerns, Gomart (2007) suggested that France concerned itself with keeping Russia tied to 
Europe to prevent instability in eastern Europe. Similarly, Larsen (2012) explained Germany’s 
reserved response to the Russia-Georgia conflict as a manifestation of the intervention of 
domestic considerations such as prioritization of economics as well as a disagreement on the 
extent or nature of the threat that Russian aggressions posed to Germany. 
Neoliberal institutionalism (NLI) (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Keohane, 1984, 1988) 
shares some theoretical assumptions with the neorealist theories but it differs in its views of the 
nature of interests and how states pursue them. NLI scholars retain the assumptions that the 
international system is anarchic and that states are unitary rational actors. Furthermore they argue 
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that interests are exogenously defined but do not focus exclusively on security, adding the pursuit 
of material wealth as an objective of states. Moreover, this perspective dispatches the assertion 
that the international system necessitates constant competition but instead suggest that 
cooperation between states is the norm. Absent this inherent enmity, a states is free to pursue 
absolute, mutual gains without fears about another getting a greater benefit than itself. In order to 
lock in future gains and prevent cheating, states create institutions, both formal and informal, 
which include ideas, norms, rules, and etiquette (Holsti, 2004, quoted by Carlsnaes, 2012: 121). 
Foreign policy from this perspective is shaped by a state’s participation in institutions. 
Implicit in an institutional perspective is a norm of multilateralism (Ruggie, 1992, 1993; 
van Oudenaren, 2003), which Ruggie defines as “an institutional form that coordinates relations 
among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct” (1993: 11). It 
conveys an expectation that states will not take unilateral action in response to international 
crises but rather that they should coordinate among themselves to arrive at a resolution based on 
accepted principles of behavior, particularly “negotiation, compromise, and the virtues of agreed 
constraint” (van Ourdenaren, 2003: 33). Multilateralism, which may appear in formal agreements 
(treaties) or be agreed to informally, represents a common practice and a largely institutionalized 
belief in Europe. Both Germany and France are known for their commitment to multilateral 
institutions for coordinating state policies (Moravcsik, 1993, Krause, 2004, Cheneval, 2007, 
Tiersky, 2010, Ikenberry, 2015) with the former particularly acknowledged for its “multilateral 
reflex” (Maull, 2000) in which it seeks first and foremost consensus solutions to problems. 
Europe is a highly institutionalized environment, with a wide range of mechanisms for 
coordinating state actions. States such as France and Germany are members of many formal, 
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regional international organizations—the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as well 
as the Council of Europe—that impact their foreign policies to varying degrees. International 
Organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization, and the G8 
similarly exert influence on French and German foreign policy preferences and decisions. In 
addition to formal institutions, France and Germany participate in a number of informal, 
multilateral institutions, especially with respect to security issues. Both countries actively 
participated in negotiations with Iran regarding its nuclear program as part of a multinational 
effort that also includes Russia and China, know as the E3+3 (three countries from Europe as 
well as three from elsewhere) or the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations 
Security Council, plus Germany). Similarly, both states strongly supported the efforts of the 
Quartet  (the EU, Russia, the United States, and the UN) in developing peaceful resolution of the 5
Israel-Palestine problem. 
Previous research on French and German foreign policy contains a significant amount of 
support for the institutionalist perspective. Scholars have described how EU membership 
circumscribes their foreign policies, subjecting them to constraints but also providing 
opportunities (Blunden, 2000; Pertusot, 2012; Aggestam, 2000; von Klaeden, 2009; Krotz and 
Schild, 2013). Most relevant for this study, observers note the impact of EU membership on 
member countries’ policies toward Russia (Smith, 2004, Karp, 2009). While EU member 
countries may be tempted to engage with Russia on a bilateral level, they likewise take into 
account how these relations may impact on other EU countries and the collateral effects on the 
 While delegating formal representation to the EU, both states actively endeavored to restart and continue 5
negotiations.
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institution as a whole. The EU, for example, established formal venues for coordination and 
cooperation with Russia such as the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement for 
encouraging multilateral engagement with Moscow. The same issues emerge with respect to 
NATO, which has set up the NATO-Russia Council for coordination the Alliances’ activities with 
Russia.   
Further removed from the neorealist assumptions that started the discussion but still 
sharing a rationalist foundation, liberal theory is founded on the primacy of internal factors in 
defining state interests and concomitant action. Retaining the view of states as rational actors 
pursuing their interests, liberals argue that relations between states are based on patterns of 
interaction resulting from the pursuit of particular goals as determined by the preferences of 
dominant social actors (Moravcsik, 1998, 2003; Doyle, 1987, 1997, 2012; Oneal and Russett, 
1997, 1999). Rather than being unitary actors, states merely represent a transmission mechanism 
for certain domestic actors such as political leaders, governing elites, interest groups, and 
business interests.  
Sources of domestic preferences generally fall into three categories — ideational, 
economic, and international. Ideational perspectives suggest that interactions stem from desired 
social goals such as human rights, international cooperation, and international law (Doyle, 1997: 
213). Second, commercial idealism presents a purely functionalist perspective, defining state 
behavior to the interests of domestic and transnational economic actors. Relations between states 
are based on market incentives and reflect the preferences for powerful commercial entities that 
reflect their desired course of action to maximize economic gain. Finally, international 
liberalism, which more frequently appears under the label of the Democratic Peace Theory 
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(DPT), focuses on the manner in which domestic political institutions aggregate preferences. 
Democratic institutions foster accountability and constrain potentially parochial interests of 
leaders in order to pursue to the preferences of broader society because of the desire of the 
governing coalition to stay in power. Narrowly, this perspective relates to the Kantian peace in 
which the combination of democratic institutions, economic interdependence and international 
institutions leads to the creation of a “separate peace” between democratic states. At the same 
time, the logic can be applied to non-democracies as well since domestic structures therein may 
likewise constrain the actions of their leaders.  
In addition, liberal theorists highlight the impact of interdependence between states 
(Keohane and Nye, 1977, Oneal and Russett, 1997, Moravcsik, 1998). This perspective notes 
that interactions between states occur across a wide range of sectors. For instance, states are not 
merely connected by economic relationship but also by political, social and cultural ties. It is not 
merely that states and substate actors interact with each other, but that they have become 
mutually dependent on each other. Furthermore, these ties lead to distinct costs and benefits that 
constrain policy choices of each state.  
A number of studies assign liberal explanations to French and German foreign policy and 
scholars have asserted the primacy of economic interests particularly in determining foreign 
policies in both countries. Chivvis and Rid (2009) argue that commercial concerns define 
specifically the German-Russian relationship. Similarly, Jean-Marie Guéhenno (2014) boldly 
asserts that economics is the sole base of French foreign policy choices. Other research (Gomart 
2007) highlights the competition within France between values and interests, highlighting the 
battle between domestic actors with differing preferences. Adomeit (2015) likewise describes the 
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influence of domestic political forces, both in and out of government, on changing German 
policies toward Russia. 
In contrast to both realist and liberal explanations, constructivists argue that state action is 
motivated not by pragmatic considerations of self-interest, but normative and ideational factors. 
Domestic variants of constructivism argue that state culture and identity shape its foreign policy 
(Katzenstein, 1996a, 1996b; Wæver, 2003; Wiarda, 2013). As seen in rationalist theories, states 
act in accordance with interests. However, from a constructivist perspective, these desired goals 
stem from their culture and an understanding of their identity, reflecting a distinct national 
political culture or way of doing things, rather than being a mere product of rational calculations 
based on exogenous preferences such as maintaining sovereignty or maximizing economic gain. 
State action conforms to its perception of itself. For example, French foreign policies are based 
on an understanding of how France ought to act in a certain situation to remain true to its ideals. 
Specifically, relevant to the subject of this study, constructivists argue that a state’s democratic 
identity, as opposed to rational calculations, leads it to prioritize the goals of democracy 
promotion and human rights in its foreign policy, and emphasize peaceful resolution of disputes, 
especially with regard to fellow democracies (von Soest and Wahman, 2014).  
In addition, relationships with other states are mutually constituted (Wiarda, 2013; 
Wendt, 1992). Cooperation or opposition are based on the states’ concepts of self and other. A 
country that desires to be a partner of another country can only be so if both states share the same 
aspiration. Similarly, adversaries are only truly in confrontation when both sides consider 
themselves at odds. These perspectives get reinforced by action over time to become constituted 
identities.  
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International explanations informed by constructivist thinking alternatively point out the 
role of international norms and the overall ideational structure of the international system in 
shaping foreign policy behavior of states (March & Olsen, 1989; Tannenwald, 1999; Wendt, 
1992, Hopf 2002). Norms have been defined as “collective understandings that make behavioral 
claims on actors” (Checkel, 1998) or more simply “collective expectations for a given 
identity” (Katzenstein, 1996b). Important to note in either definition above is the emphasis on the 
collective nature of the norm as well as its influence on actors. It is also critical to highlight the 
distinction between constitutive and regulative influences, which reflect the agent-system 
distinction mentioned above. The former describes how identities shape interest and therefore 
behavior while the latter describes the expectations of interstate behavior that constrain or enable 
state actions (Katzenstein, 1996a). 
Much of the research concerning French and German foreign policies point to 
constructivist explanations (Chivvis and Rid, 2009; Hellmann, 2009; Karp 2009; Katzenstein, 
1997; Opperman 2012; Rittberger, 2001; Sparling 2003; Treacher 2003a, 2003b). In both 
instances scholars emphasize historical events that have left their mark on these states’ identities. 
As a result of the wars of 20th century, Germany has developed a “culture of restraint,” 
according to which it is conservative in responding to conflicts with other states. Germany has 
also maintained its unique focus on being a “civilian” (as opposed to military) power, using 
resources other than military capabilities in its conduct of international affairs. Similarly, France 
has developed certain unique foreign policy priorities and interests. The legacy of World War II 
and its aftermath led to a distinct Gaullist foreign policy which focuses on maintaining France’s 
grandeur (greatness) as well as its rang (rank) among leading nations of the world (Treacher, 
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2003, 2013). Consequently, France has perpetuated a view of itself as a great power, a prospect 
that has been enhanced by its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, and 
believes that it has a responsibility to continue to involve itself globally. Furthermore, as a 
former colonial power, France feels a responsibility to promote peace and prosperity in a 
significant number of African countries as well as in the Levant. 
Alternatively, the foreign policies of these states are seen as the result of conforming to 
international norms (Davidson, 2013; Rittberger, 2001; Wagnsson, 2010; Wolff, 2013). European 
states face a number of both constitutive as well as regulative norms that guide their behavior 
and would be expected to uphold international norms of peaceful conflict resolution, respect for 
state sovereignty, and the protection of human rights. As a result of its commitment to upholding 
these expectations, European countries, particularly Germany, have earned the title of “normative 
powers” (Manners 2000, 2006). 
Finally, one variant of the liberal perspective, the Democratic Peace Theory, suggests that 
a state’s foreign policy is a function of its regime type.  Fundamentally, the DPT research finds 6
that democracies behave differently toward each other than they do toward non-democracies. 
Pacific behavior between joint democracies has been attributed to the externalization of 
democratic norms, such as conflict resolution through compromise and negotiation (Kahl 1998; 
Maoz & Russett, 1993), or the constraints stemming from domestic political structures (Fearon, 
1994; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, & Smith, 1999; Schultz, 1999). At the same time, 
democracies engage in conflictual behavior with regard to non-democracies when necessary. The 
scholarship on DPT is largely represented in large-n cross-national studies, whereas only few 
 This research agenda has its basis in liberal thought as noted above.  However, I list it separately 6
because scholars advance explanations that depart from liberal foundations.
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qualitative analyses have been used to trace the DPT causal mechanisms in selected historical 
cases.  However, one study of German-Russian relations (Adomeit, 2015) clearly asserts that 
German policy toward Russia has changed in recent years in response to both domestic and 
foreign policies in Russia. 
Recently, scholars have begun to apply the logic of the democratic peace to sanctions as a 
tool of statecraft, being another form of coercive behavior (Cox & Drury, 2006; Lektzian & 
Souva, 2003; von Soest & Wahman, 2015). Similar to the foundational DPT conclusions, initial 
research on sanctions suggested that democracies employ sanctions more often but are less likely 
to do so against fellow democracies (Cox and Drury, 2006; Lektzian and Souva, 2003). 
Likewise, other scholars suggest that democratic institutions constrain decision makers in 
democracies in the use of economic coercion against democratic states. Relevant to this 
particular study, additional research has shown that democracies restrain sanctioning behavior 
with respect to security-related conflicts but not with respect to those in the economic domain 
(Wallace, 2013). 
One shortcoming of this literature, however, is the way it dichotomizes all regimes into 
two categories—democracies and non-democracies—considering nothing in-between. The 
research has not focused on what could be called the “trajectory” of the target regime or the 
direction of political change. Do democratic states act differently toward states that are stable, 
firmly entrenched autocracies versus states that are transitioning toward or away from 
democracy? One recent study on Western reactions to domestic crises (such as a coups d’état or 
mass protests) found that states’ policies are based in part on the sender’s expectation of success, 
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which depends on the stability of the existing regime (von Soest and Wahman, 2014). This 
suggests that states do, in fact, relate differently to states that are in transition.  
Certain variants of DPT and constructivism highlight the importance of a state’s 
perception of other nations. For instance, one early study (Owen, 1994) examines the impact of 
perceptions and finds that apparently deviant cases in which democracies have gone to war with 
each other, can be explained by the democratic aggressor’s perceptions of the target state as both 
“illiberal” and “non-democracy”. At the same time, perception of democracy alone may not 
suffice. Farnham (2003) suggested that the perception of a regime’s commitment to democratic 
principles such as negotiated settlement, even if not a democracy itself, determines a democratic 
state’s foreign policy behaviors toward the non-democracies. 
The Art of the Possible - Competing Explanations of Foreign Policy Behavior 
Each of the above theories offers a potential explanation for French and German reactions to 
Russian interventions in Georgia and Ukraine. Below, I present theoretically-informed potential 
explanations of the French and German foreign policy choices toward Russia based on 
preliminary empirical considerations. None of these theories has been tested on the two cases of 
Russia’s intervention in Georgia and Ukraine respectively, and obviously many objections could 
be raised to the assertions.  The utility of these possibilities lies in presenting a plausible case that 
identifies the factors that might possibly inform foreign policy decisions and can serve as the 
foundation for analyzing French and German discourse.  Furthermore, these explanations will 
inform the hypotheses examined in the remainder of the thesis and serve as the foundation for 
discourse analysis.  
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The neorealist paradigm offers three potential explanations for French and German 
reactions to Russian interventions. From a purely systemic perspective, states are expected to 
react to shifts in the balance of power at the international level by balancing against those states 
that increase their relative capabilities. Earlier in this study, I cited the example of France and 
Germany aligning with Russia to balance the growing power of the US. According to this same 
neorealist perspective, France and Germany would be expected to balance against any future 
changes in the international status quo. The Russo-Georgian war resulted in no systemic shifts 
and therefore no balancing behavior on the part of states, which explains the limited European 
reaction, i.e., the lack of support for sanctions. Russia neither gained any territory nor increased 
its military capability. Having been present in the separatist areas of Georgia since the early 
1990s, Russia’s military presence there after 2008 did not increase the amount of territory over 
which they maintained (de facto) control.  Furthermore, the Russian intervention, despite its 
success against Georgian forces, was plagued by poor performance and failures. This was not the 
case with the Ukrainian intervention, however. Through its annexation of Crimea Russia added 
territory and population as well as secured its unfettered access to the Black Sea. Furthermore, 
the Russian military had undertaken significant defense reforms since its performance in 2008. 
Defense spending had increased significantly. Weapons systems had been upgraded. Command 
and control headquarters had been streamlined and exercised (Economist, 2014; Nichol, 2011; 
Rathke, 2015). Unlike Russia however, European capabilities had decreased as a result of 
reduced defense spending. Moreover, from an alliance perspective, NATO was regionally less 
capable in Europe itself because the United States had removed significant forces from Europe. 
In sum, the neorealist perspective suggests that French and German behaviors were the result of 
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changes in states’ relative capabilities at the international level. By implementing sanctions 
against Russia, these states demonstrated a desire to balance against increasing Russian power. 
The defensive realist perspective suggests that geographic proximity, offensive capability, 
and aggressive intentions moderate the systemic impact of changes at the international system 
level. In the cases considered here, these additional factors can also account for French and 
German behavior. More specifically, Georgia is further removed from France and Germany than 
Ukraine. In addition, as mentioned above, the Russian military failed to show an offensive 
capability capable of threatening or defeating a more capable adversary. Having witnessed 
Russian military modernization and having seen the ability of Russian forces to reinforce Crimea 
and mass on the border of Ukraine, European leaders would have perceived greater offensive 
capability in Russian forces. Finally, the fact that Russia was (in the eyes of some) merely 
responding to Georgian attacks on Russian peacekeepers may have prevented policy makers 
from seeing Russia as aggressive in their intentions in 2008. In later years, elites could no longer 
ignore Russian aggressive intentions toward its neighbors and former Soviet republics. As a 
result of distinct differences in threat perception, European countries adopted contrary polices. 
For the neoclassical realist, an explanation can be found in the impacts of domestic 
factors on foreign policy. While, from a strictly structural perspective, France and Germany 
should have opposed Russia in both instances, an argument can be made that they did not do so 
because of elite assessments of the opportunities and challenges accompanying the systemic 
changes. In particular, concerns with energy security, the presence of other shared security 
interests, and the desire for Russian assistance with more prominent security issues prevented 
European policy makers from taking actions to confront Russia in 2008. However, by 2014, 
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these topics were less salient and no longer influenced the thinking of foreign policy makers, 
allowing France and Germany to take actions to balance against Russian interventions. Energy 
security has been a significant concern to Europe for many years, especially for the states of 
central and eastern Europe. For instance, Germany relies on Russian gas imports for 
approximately 75% of its demand for energy. While not as highly dependent on Russia because 
of its nuclear power infrastructure and imports from Norway, France remains cognizant of the 
challenges faced by its EU neighbors with regard to energy and therefore maintains a focus on 
maintaining reliable sources of energy throughout the region. In addition, both France and 
Germany desired Russian support in regard to security concerns that Russia was enabling or 
supporting. Despite the possibility of a long term threat due to increased Russian power, other 
security concerns took priority in the eyes of French and German foreign policy elites. For 
instance, in 2008, NATO forces in Afghanistan were supported by a logistics supply line that ran 
through Russia. All three countries similarly felt mutual concern about security-related matters 
such as international terrorism, organized crime, and nuclear non-proliferation. However, as the 
salience of these concerns faded, they failed to exert similar influence on French and German 
policy makers by the time of the Russian intervention in Ukraine. While European dependence 
on hydrocarbon imports from Russia has not abated, the associated insecurity has decreased as a 
result of an EU plan implemented in 2009 requiring states to maintain reserves and developing 
alternative sources of oil and gas. In addition, by 2014 NATO had reduced its operations in 
Afghanistan and was less reliant on supplies transiting Russia. Finally, other threats to security 
such as terrorism had declined in importance and western Europe required less Russian 
assistance to counter them. Consequently, as a result of reduced salience of competing security 
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interests, systemic imperatives resulted in more traditional response, namely confrontation 
through the implementation of sanctions. 
The institutionalist focus suggests yet another explanation for the different policies 
pursued by the western European states, based on the effectiveness of multilateralism as an 
institutional form. In other words, their reactions were based on the ability or inability to arrive at 
coordinated multilateral solutions to international problems. Beginning with shared opposition to 
the American-led invasion of Iraq, France and Germany believed that Russia was committed to 
multilateral solutions. These states (and the EU) had also been working with Russia to reach 
coordinated international solutions to issues concerning Iran and the Middle East. In keeping 
with this establish practice, Germany and France choose to pursue multilateral, consensual 
solutions to the Russia-Georgia conflict incorporating Russia rather than supporting sanctions, 
which resulted in the negotiated cease-fire. By the time of the conflict in Ukraine, however, 
France and Germany no longer sought resolution through multilateral venues that included 
Russia, especially with regard to situations in which Europe and Russia disagreed, such as the 
uprising and civil war in Syria. Russia had not cooperated with the West in their attempts to 
transition power in Syria from the Assad regime and was therefore no longer seen as a reliable 
multinational player, despite its complementary efforts in the other areas. Since the influence of 
multilateralism on Russian foreign policy had waned, France and Germany pursued a solution to 
the Ukraine crisis that did not include Russia and supported EU sanctions. 
A liberal explanation is rooted in shifting domestic preferences. Accounting for 
differences in French and German policies between 2008 and 2014 therefore requires either a 
change in dominant societal actors or changes in preferences of the most influential domestic 
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groups. Liberals suggest that France and Germany had an interest in maintaining cooperative 
relations with Russia based on economic and other material interests in 2008 while these 
concerns had declined by 2014 and allowed these countries to take a more confrontational stance 
toward Russia. As mentioned above, many observers of both French and German foreign policy 
assign an economic motive to all foreign policy decisions, which manifested itself in the limited 
response to Russian intervention in Georgia. Having increased economic ties between the two 
countries significantly in the early 2000s and feeling continued pressure from business interests, 
each country wanted to avoid disrupting their deepening commercial ties in 2008. Energy 
imports from Russia constituted an enormous portion of the trade but relations between the 
countries spread into many other sectors as well. Germany exported cars, machinery, electrical 
engineering components, and pharmaceuticals in addition to providing support in the areas of 
logistics, transport, and aviation. Similarly, French exchanges with Russia consisted of 
investments in aircraft, communications, infrastructure, and high speed railways. Sanctions 
against Russia would obviously have disrupted these exchanges. Absent a more powerful 
domestic force, commercial actors prevailed, resulting in a lack of support for sanctions against 
Russia. While trade remained robust in 2014, with overall levels increasing in both bilateral 
relationships, and additional areas of cooperation, such as space projects between France and 
Russia, emerging to tie the countries together, the preferences of these actors for refraining from 
confrontation and maintaining commercial ties failed to hold sway in 2014. The constraints of 
bilateral economic relations vanished and France and Germany supported the imposition of 
sanctions against Russia. 
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Constructivist accounts offer both internal as well as systemic explanations for the 
observed state behavior. Domestic accounts look to state identity as the basis for state action and 
might suggest that the difference came from changes in shared identity. In 2008, France and 
Germany felt that Russia was becoming an integral part of Europe, committed to the shared 
values of liberal democracy and market economy, and therefore they perceived it as part of the 
group of European nations. As a result, France and Germany felt it was also consistent with their 
identity as democratic states with normative goals of promoting economic and political 
development elsewhere in Europe not to respond to a modernizing state in a confrontational 
manner and opposed sanctions against Russia. However, by 2014, France and Germany no 
longer subscribed to this understanding of shared identity, which transformed Russia into a 
threatening Other. The pull of shared identity no longer served to inhibit confrontational behavior 
between the western European countries and Russia, resulting in support for sanctions.  
At the same time, other constructivist perspectives assert that collective expectations of 
western European states motivate foreign policy decisions based on what actions are appropriate 
for their state in a particular context. In conflict situations, European states place significant 
emphasis on the legitimacy of state action, both their own and that of other states with which 
they will interact. With regard to the situations under considerations, a constructivist perspective 
suggests that norms of human rights, territorial integrity, sovereignty, and/or peaceful resolution 
of conflict directed the policies of France and Germany. Specifically, it could be argued that the 
Russian intervention in Georgia did not violate human rights norms since it could be seen as a 
legitimate response to Georgian attacks on ethnic Russians in South Ossetia in 2008. In contrast, 
French and German decision makers viewed the Russian intervention in Ukraine in 2014 as a 
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violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. Alternatively, the western European 
states may have been motivated by norms of international (or regional) peace and stability. In 
2008, the conflict between Russia and Georgia ended in a negotiated cease-fire that was 
acceptable to both parties as well as other regional actors (states and international organizations) 
relatively quickly and without more confrontational actions. However, in 2014 Russia and 
Ukraine did not reach a cease-fire without the implementation of sanctions.  
The final potential explanation relies on democratic peace logic, which asserts that 
democratic states behave in distinctly different ways toward democracies than non-democracies. 
In addition, I argue that this approach should also incorporate decision makers’ perceptions of the 
target state, not merely objective measures of its domestic politics.  Furthermore, the DPT 
assertions apply to states in transition as well; regardless of where they stand at the moment, the 
direction of movement of domestic institutions matters as well.  The argument here is that Russia 
was democratizing, on its way to becoming a democracy and therefore western European 
democracies ought to react to Russia as if it were a democracy already. This is not to say that 
Russia was more of a democracy in 2008 or that decision makers saw Russia as a democracy. 
According to accepted measures of democracy, the state of the Russian domestic politics did not 
change between the two time periods.  Moreover, foreign policy elites did not suggest that 7
Russia had fully transitioned to a western-style democracy; despite the presence of institutions, 
other facets such as freedom of the press were absent. However, believing Russia to be moving 
toward liberal democracy, French and German politicians treated Russia as if it were a 
democracy and in a non-confrontational rather than hostile manner, refraining from imposing 
 Freedom House rated Russia consistently in 2008 and 2014 as a 5.5 (not free) on a scale where 1 is best 7
and 7 is worst.  The Polity IV database gave Russia the same overall score in both years of 4.
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sanctions in 2008. However, in 2014, these states believed Russia to be retreating from liberal 
democracy and therefore related to it as a non-democracy, choosing to support coercive action. 
Hypotheses 
The foregoing arguments offer plausible explanations for the observed differences in foreign 
policy behavior and provide the foundation for the following hypotheses focused on factors 
consistent with competing theoretical approaches.  In subsequent sections of this study, I will 
evaluate these hypotheses based on the data obtained through discourse analysis.  
Based on the neorealist perspective suggesting that structural changes in the distribution 
of power necessitate state responses: 
H1: Perceptions of change in systemic and/or regional distributions of power and polarity 
explain the change in French and German foreign policy behavior. 
Similarly, stemming from the neoclassical realist argument that internal factors of a state 
mitigate responses to systemic imperatives: 
H2: Changes in elite perceptions of Russia as a threat or an ally explain French and 
German foreign policy behavior. 
From an institutional approach that asserts that states seek institutional solutions, both 
formal and informal, to maximize gains and ensure future benefits: 
H3: The weakening of the multilateralist institutions that include Russia, France, and 
Germany explain French and German foreign policy behavior. 
Finding its basis in changes in domestic preferences, a liberal explanation focused on 
maximizing economic interests: 
!34
H4: Concerns related to economic relationships with Russia explain French and German 
foreign policy behavior. 
The first constructivist account focuses on the influence of state identities and suggests: 
H5: Perceptions of a Russian European identity explain French and German foreign 
policy behavior. 
Another constructivist approach focusing on international norms and state reaction to 
violations of them yields: 
H6: Perceptions of Russian violations of international norms explain French and German 
foreign policy behavior. 
Finally, the DPT logic arguing that democratic states relate differently to other states 
based on regime type leads to the following: 
H7: Perceptions regarding the state of democracy in Russia explain French and German 
foreign policy behavior. 
Methodology 
Evaluating the hypotheses above requires connecting the suggested explanatory factor to changes 
in foreign policy choices of European countries in response to Russian interventions. The 
analysis begins therefore with the focus on foreign policy behavior—rejecting sanctions vs. 
supporting sanctions—as the dependent variable, in which there is observed change. On the other 
side of equation, each potential explanation suggests an independent variable. The goal of this 
study is to discover which of these factors were present/absent and changed from Time 1 (2008) 
to Time 2 (2014) either in terms of being present/absent or the intensity of their impact that will 
indicate an association with the dependent variable.  
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To evaluate the alternative theoretical explanations for the French and German foreign 
policy, this study employs the methodology of discourse analysis. A robust amount of 
scholarship exists on discourse analysis, particularly political discourse analysis (Chilton, 2004; 
Chilton and Schäffner, 2002, 2016; Fairclough, 2003; Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012; Fetzer, 
2013; Fetzer and Weizman, 2006; Gee, 2010) and more specifically related to European foreign 
policy (Carta and Wodak, 2015; Hansen and Wæver, 2002; Howarth and Torfing, 2005; Larsen 
1997; Jorgensen, 2015; Morin and Carta, 2014; Wagnsson, 2008). This approach to foreign 
policy analysis relies on the study of empirical evidence in the forms of text and talk, i.e., 
utterances in both written and verbal form. Given the availability of this data from a wide variety 
of sources including governmental publications and media reports, this methodology avails itself 
to a rich source of data (Chilton and Schäffner, 2016).  
Since social and political activity does not exist without the use of language, much can be 
learned about the practices through the study of language in social context, which is captured by 
the notion of discourse. Discourse analysis encompasses a series of approaches to the study of 
language use and its functions. It rests on the premise that politics is ‘done’ through language, 
i.e., the struggle for power or cooperation takes place through the venue of communication 
(Chilton and Schäffner, 2002). Political discourse analysis does not claim to uncover “true” or 
“hidden” motivations of political actors, if indeed this were possible (Waever, 2005). Neither is 
discourse seen as merely “cheap talk” or “merely semantics”. Rather, politicians use their 
rhetoric strategically to provide justification for the actions that the state has taken or will take in 
the future for they understand that they will be held accountable by the public, challenged by 
political opponents, and judged by other states for their actions (Wagnsson, 2010). Public 
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communication provides a venue for politicians to present to both their own constituencies as 
well as a broader international audience a vision of the state and the impulses behind foreign 
policies (Larsen, 1997). In other words, the reasons that policy makers expound, both implicitly 
and explicitly, serve as the reasons for state action. The descriptions and explanations therefore 
become the meaning behind the decisions.  
In considering which discourse to analyze, I was guided by Fetzer’s (2013) perspectives 
on political discourse, which includes three categories — politics “from above”, politics in the 
media, and politics “from below.” Empirical evidence examined in this study falls in the first two 
of Fetzer’s perspectives of political discourse. The majority of data come from mediated 
discourse, such as interviews, wherein politicians interact with members of the media. In these 
cases, politicians present their case dynamically, restating their assertions or defending their 
claims as a result of questions or comments from the person conducting the interview. Due to the 
interactive format of the discourse, these texts are preferable.  However, because of limited 
English-language texts in German I was unable to obtain interviews for most of the years up 
through 2010.  Nevertheless, all of the French and most of the German texts from the latter years 
fit into this group.  Additional data come from documents that reflect the politics from above 
perspective. These texts come from leading politicians who communicate in a one-sided 
discourse such as in press releases, speeches, and declarations. Again due to the constraints of 
access to data, most German texts prior to 2010 fall into this category.  
In addition, rhetoric originates from a number of sources. As described by Goffman 
(1981), discourse stems from a “principal,” whose position is reflected in the text, the “author,” 
who composes the text, and finally the “animator” who ultimately provides the text, either in 
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written or verbal form. In this study, empirical evidence comes from speakers in each of these 
categories. Frequently, individual foreign policy decision makers, such as the German Chancellor 
or Foreign Minister or French President or Minister of Foreign Affairs will serve as both the 
principal and animator of the state’s policy. At the same time, each country’s bureaucratic entities 
that support these principals serve as the “animators” of the state’s policy, as commonly seen in 
press releases from the foreign ministries or the President’s office. While there is a possibility of 
government speakers presenting divergent messages, I assume the discourse reflects a common 
position whether it originates from the President/Chancellor’s office or the Foreign Ministry/
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Blunden (2000: 28-29) notes, there is “almost permanent symbiosis” 
between foreign policy making entities within the French government. Similarly, the potential for 
disagreement within German foreign policy making circles is mitigated by institutions that 
encourage the Chancellor and her ministers to present a united front (Rittberger, 2001: 97). 
Therefore, I take the official texts as accurate representations of government rhetoric as a whole, 
regardless of their source or their type.  
Foreign policy discourse appears in a variety of forms but usually gets transformed into 
written texts, which serve as repositories of the discourse. Some are written versions of verbal 
communication such as transcripts of speeches, press conferences, or interviews. Other texts 
exist only in written form such as press releases or communiqués. At the same time, others 
represent mere summaries of proceedings such as those that record Parliamentary debates 
(Chilton and Schäffner, 2016). Alternatively, discourse can be captured in other media such as 
video and audio recordings. Regardless of the original format, the statements are typically 
preserved in documents, which then become the data to be analyzed through discourse analysis.  
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The texts examined in this study reflect both verbal and written original sources but were all 
reviewed in written form.  
The first step in analyzing French and German foreign policy discourse is to identity the 
dominant theme. While aspects of each theme appear across time, one or perhaps a couple 
themes may present themselves more frequently than others. The temporal focus begins with 
individual conflict years, 2008 and 2014, as these are the years in which the specific foreign 
policy behaviors occur that form the basis of this research. To avoid the ‘endogeneity” problem, 
whereby changes in discourse are produced by the Russian interventions in Georgia and Ukraine 
(rather than the other way around, i.e., changes in discourse representatives of changes in the 
explanatory factors precede change in foreign policy), I expanded the temporal span of analysis 
to include years preceding both interventions.  As a result, the data to be analyzed includes all the 
years between 2003 and 2014. The former date corresponds to a time of distinct change in the 
relationship between both France and Germany and Russia as a result of their shared opposition 
to the US-led war in Iraq. The latter date carries the study through the end of the year of the 
Ukrainian conflict. By that point, sanctions had been implemented in several steps and the 
perspectives of European states were fully developed. 
To convert the texts into data for assessing the alternative explanations of French and 
German foreign policy, I used the foreign policy theories and alternative hypotheses derived 
from competing theoretical perspectives to identify the main “themes” and key “terms” 
associated with the themes. The development of the codes was an iterative process. Beginning 
with theories of foreign policy and international relations I derived a set of codes based on 
expected indicators of foreign policy motivations (see Table 2). 
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While analyzing the texts, terms emerged that provided a better reflection of the 
discourse and therefore were added to or exchanged with the list of terms selected for the initial 
analysis of the texts. It is important not to employ this process too frequently as it could lead to 
an overabundance of terms that become so specific that they lose any value for identifying 
trends. At times it was necessary to apply a code that fits the discussion best even if a unique 
identifier seemed more appropriate. To keep track of texts and maintain data on codes, I used 
Atlas.Ti, a qualitative analysis software. The final list of codes with the relevant theoretical ties 
and descriptions that I applied to the texts appears in Table 3.  
Table 2 — Initial Themes and Theories





Countering the US Balance (counter, oppose, etc.) 




the balance of 
power
Power (and synonyms) 





Russia posing a 
threat
Threat and derivatives (to Europe, 






Partnership/alliance (with Russia) in 
war on terror 












Mutually beneficial solution 





Energy security Gas/oil supply 
European needs from Russia





Legitimacy International law 




International   
Norms 














Democratic norms Democracy and derivatives 
Shared values 
Appropriate state behavior
Table 3 — Final Themes and Theories
Theoretical link Code Description
Neorealism Great Power Depictions of Russia as a Great Power, suggesting its 
status as a pole in the international system which would 
lead to behavior on its part as well as that of other states 
in the system.
Polarity Descriptions of the nature of the international system; 
suggesting that states act in response to changes in the 
distributions of capabilities within the system.
Neoclassical 
realism
Security References to the role that Russia plays in regard to 
French, regional or global security, not from a systemic 
point of view but from a more absolute perspective on 
impacts of Russian actions.
Energy security Discussions about France’s or Europe’s need for access 
to energy, not from an economic point of view but from 
a security perspective.
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Descriptions of Russia as a partner in coordinating 
multinational responses to regional and global security 
concerns; instances where France sees Russia as 
cooperating with other nations toward a common end
Multilateral 
disagreement
References to instances in which France and Russia have 
diverged in preferred policies in response to crises; 
issues where France sees Russia as not cooperating with 




Discussions of economic relations between France and 
Russia; highlights of economic issues
Interdependence References to shared interests across multiple areas 




Depictions of Russia as a liberal democracy; goes 
beyond merely democratic reforms to include progress 




References to French expectations of Russia based on its 
status as a great power or a leading member of 
international organizations; discussions of Russia’s 
international responsibilities
Human rights References to the need to take into account human rights 
in the conduct of interstate relations; discussions of the 
need for actions to maintain the rights of individuals, 
including the protection of non-combatants.
Integrity Discussions of the international norm of respecting the 
territorial integrity of other states; opposes actions or 
policies that violate a state’s established boundaries
International 
law
Discussions about the need to adhere to international law 
in the conduct of international affairs; appeals for Russia 
to abide by international law in its actions
Sovereignty References to the international norm of sovereignty; 
accounts of the appropriateness of respecting a state’s 
independence
!42
A couple of examples will demonstrate the application of codes to texts as well as the display of 
information in Atlas.Ti. First, in Figure 1 taken from an interview with Foreign Minister 
Steinmeier (2006), the issue of energy security clearly presents itself: 
!  
Figure 1  Example Coding No. 1 (energy security) 
The codes applied include one for the speaker, the foreign minister; the issue, Energy; and 
the theme, energy security. 
A second example demonstrates how theoretically informed themes encapsulate various 
issues contained in the discourse. The quote shown in Figure 2 from Foreign Minister 
Westerwelle (2013) highlights the theme of interdependence in the context of the rest of the text: 
!  




References to the international norm of resolving 
international disputes without resorting to violence; calls 





Descriptions of the state of Russian democracy in a 




References to a concern with the state or progress of 
Russian democracy; not outright condemnation but 
expressions of uncertainty about the Russia’s 
commitment to western-style democracy
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The screenshot from Atlas.Ti shows the various codes assigned to this text. The speaker is 
again identified as the Foreign Minister, the issue is that of bilateral relations, and the theme is 
interdependence, assigned as a result of the reference to “broad and multifaceted” cooperation 
based on both “economies and societies” being “closely intertwined.” 
The segments to be coded varied in length. For example, many texts included the 
transcripts of interviews, which invariably start with a question and are followed by a response 
from the policy maker or representative. In these instances, both the question and the paragraph 
in responses to it comprised the “unit of analysis”. Sometimes, particularly in response to a long 
or multi-part question, the response consisted of multiple succeeding paragraphs, which I treated 
as separate segments. In the event that a multi-paragraph response addressed only one theme, I 
treated it as a single “unit of analysis” and counted it only once as an example of a particular 
theme. On rare occasions, a text would contain a terse, succinct answer containing references to 
several issues and a multiplicity of themes. In these cases, a single sentence was used as a coded 
segment. Each coded segment received a primary code in accordance with the theme it 
corresponded to, but was also identified according to speaker, issue, and orientation of the speech 
toward Russia. I chose this manner of coding in order to allow for flexibility in analyzing the 
data. Alternatively, I could have created a separate code for each combination of factors 
reflecting speaker-issue-theme-orientation but this would have led to a more cumbersome set of 
codes and would have made interpretation more complicated. 
Analysis of French Foreign Policy Discourse 
 Initially I take each country as its own case study and make each a separate chapter.  This 
chapter applies discourse analysis to relate French foreign policy rhetoric with the theoretically 
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possible explanations provided above. I begin by outlining the documents that record the 
discourse and review the issues around which the dialogue revolves.  Subsequently I highlight 
the themes found in the rhetoric and compare their salience over time.  Finally, I examine the 
hypotheses in light of the empirical findings. 
French data sources 
In order to analyze French foreign policy motivations, I relied on texts published by the 
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on their website , which offers an extensive, 8
searchable database of foreign policy-related documents across the range of this study. However, 
due to the thoroughness of this database, the amount of data discovered was excessive and 
needed to be reduced in some manner.  
The website made the initial search for data easy, although since the documents were in 
French I had to translate them once downloaded. Focusing on French relations with Russia, I 
began the search using the terms representing both the country (Russie) as well as the 
accompanying adjective (Russe). In addition, since heads of state and/or heads of government 
represent their country and its regime, I included the names of specific leaders, namely Vladimir 
Putin (Poutine, in French) and Sergei Medvedev as search terms. As mentioned above, in order 
to capture the nature of Franco-Russian relations over time, I looked for texts from 2003 to 2014.  
Searching using only these terms yielded over 1500 usable results as reflected in Table 4, 
which was an unwieldy number. I employ the term usable because I did not include each and 
every document that the search returned; rather, I scanned each document to find the instance of 
the search terms to determine whether it related to a foreign policy issue. In a number of 
 http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr8
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instances, the references to Russia were not related to a foreign policy issue. For instance, Russia 
may have been mentioned in a discussion relating to another country, such as the United States, 
in a way that was irrelevant to international politics or to French relationship with Russia or one 
of its leaders. Upon completion I had collected a significant number of texts that offered a wide 
variety of perspectives.
To facilitate the reduction of data, I first examined the number of texts by type. All texts 
but the interview fit Fetzer’s (2013) categories “politics from above,” while interviews represent 
the category of mediated politics. As demonstrated in the Table 4, interviews and press releases 
formed the bulk of the texts. For both practical and theoretical reasons, I decided to rely solely 
on interview transcripts. While interviews represent one of the two largest categories, they are 
fewer in number than press releases, making the data collection task more feasible. Since a 
significant amount of redundancy exists between interviews and press releases, I felt that there 
would be no loss of fidelity in limiting the analysis to the former. Moreover, the same events 
form the basis of both types of documents. More importantly, the interview texts represent a 
Table	4	—	Types	of	French	texts
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total
Press 
Release
101 78 80 58 54 46 89 58 40 43 87 77 811
Interview 35 38 33 29 32 46 20 23 30 42 22 42 392
Press 
Conference
3 10 10 14 9 13 21 13 17 22 9 29 170
Declaration 5 1 1 1 12 3 5 9 6 5 4 24 76
Speech 1 2 2 7 3 8 13 6 7 2 4 2 57
Statement 4 2 2 4 6 3 1 5 0 1 0 1 29
Total 149 131 128 113 116 119 149 114 100 115 126 175 1535
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slightly different form of discourse than the press releases. As dialogical texts, they capture 
interaction between the speaker and the journalist, allowing for certain points to be challenged, 
clarified, or explored in greater detail. Finally, interviewees were government principals rather 
than spokespersons, which locates the discourse as close as possible to the decision-maker and 
better reflects their actual position. 
The origins of the texts demonstrate significant variety. Given that the data came from the 
MFA website, it is no surprise that the primary interviewee was the Foreign Minister (83% of 
texts). However, other representatives of the government also made significant contributions. 
Presidential interviews provided almost five percent of the texts followed by the Prime Minister 
(4%) as well as the Secretary of State for European Affairs (3%). Other speakers such as the 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations and the Minister of Defense provide periodic 
interviews as well. Additional variety stems from the audiences for which the interviews were 
conducted or, more to the point, who was asking the questions. Not surprisingly, the 
overwhelming market for interviews was France. As likewise expected, the second-most frequent 
audience was Russia. Other frequent sites of interviews were the United Kingdom, Poland, and 
Germany. Considering Varied environments facilitates comparison of the discourse oriented 
toward domestic as well as external contexts, allowing for alternate perspectives on foreign 
policy motivations. 
What did they talk about? Issues in French-Russian discourse 
French and Russian interactions occurred in a variety of contexts. As globally active states, both 
became involved in security issues of regional and global concern. During the period under 
consideration (2003-2014), France and Russia had opportunities as members of multilateral fora 
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to influence security situations ranging from Central Asia to the Middle East and North Africa. 
At the same time, they actively engaged each other in bilateral issues not only related to security 
but also to economics and other areas. Finally, given France’s integration in the European Union, 
these countries interacted within the framework of EU-Russia relations. 
While multilateral security issues dominated the focus of Franco-Russian dialogue during 
the period under consideration, bilateral concerns retained a regular presence. These issues came 
from a number of sectors across the range of state interactions, such as economics, military 
cooperation, cultural exchanges, and spatial cooperation. In 2002 France and Russia established 
the Conseil de Cooperation franco-russe sur les questions de security (Cooperation Council on 
Questions of Security) or CCQS for the purpose of coordinating security policies and these 
meetings continued annually through 2013. Similarly, the countries regularly conduct meetings 
of the Conseil économique, financier, industriel et commercial (CEFIC) (Economic, Finance, 
Industrial and Commercial Council). Regarding space, France and Russia have worked together 
on space launches as well as implementing Galileo, the European Global Positioning Service. 
While the majority of economic engagement with Russia occurs in the EU context, nevertheless 
the countries continued to share an interest in bilateral economic cooperation as well. 
In addition to maintaining their bilateral relations, France and Russia engaged each other 
in a wide variety of multilateral contexts. The French remained very aware of the reality of the 
European Union and at times couched its discourse about Russia within a European framework. 
As mentioned above, a European perspective dominates economic relations with Russia. Even 
more, France approached energy security issues from a broader standpoint, reinforcing efforts of 
its EU counterparts. French efforts in this area are especially notable given the fact that France 
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imports relatively little hydrocarbons from Russia. On security matters, French discourse related 
to collective efforts on behalf of the EU as well as NATO to coordinate and cooperate with 
Russia. Both of these organizations had established working fora, namely the EU-Russia council 
and the NATO-Russia council, in pursuit of multinational coordination. More specifically, France 
did not directly participate in the Middle East Peace Process but rather left it to representatives 
from the European Union to coordinate with the other members of the “Quartet”, i.e., Russia, the 
United States, and the United Nations. 
Over time, international events occupied the attention of leading states around the world, 
including France and Russia, flaring and receding in salience, and changing the focus of French 
discourse toward Russia along with it. As indicated in Figure 3, the primary issues related to 
Franco-Russian relations were: Russian democracy, energy, EU-Russian relations, the Russo-
Georgian war, Iran’s nuclear program, Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program, the 
Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) between Israel and Palestine, the civil war in Syria, and the 
conflict in Ukraine (including Crimea). Below I describe in greater detail the changing focus 
over the time span under consideration as the basis for this study. 
The year 2003 brought with it increased attention to the international concern with Iraq’s 
WMD programs. While the United States had been preparing for war as a result of Iraq’s 
repeated issues of non-compliance with the UN-approved inspection regime, few European 
countries supported the American desire to use force to compel Iraqi compliance or remove 
Saddam Hussein from power. While the United Kingdom and Spain aligned themselves with the 
US, France, Germany and Russia formed a formidable international opposition. The problem of 
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Iraq provided an impetus for even greater cooperation between France and Russia, resulting in 
the overwhelming majority (25 of 44) of French statements during this year related to this issue. 
The following year brought a new priority for these countries. That is not to say that Iraq 
was no longer an issue. Indeed, it shared the spotlight with a different set of problems—events in 
Israel and Palestine, or what is referred to as the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). In the 
interview transcripts related to Franco-Russian relations, the situation in Iraq formed 
approximately 23% of the discourse while the MEPP emerged in roughly 34% of the texts. 
Related to both Iraq and Israel-Palestine, the Iran nuclear issue captured the attention of 
France and Russia once again in 2005 and kept the focus on challenges in the Middle East, which 
would dominate the discussion for the next several years. At this point, French discourse 
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contained very little about the Iraq problem, appearing in less than 4% of the quotes. Similarly, 
the MEPP was mentioned only in 13% of the segments. In their place, discussions of the Iranian 
nuclear program assumed priority, appearing in 30% of quotations. This year also brought the 
greatest distribution of topics as can be seen in the fact that the three primary concerns accounted 
for less than 50% of the discourse. During this year, bilateral issues (11%) and also appeared 
frequently. 
In subsequent years, French rhetoric continued to focus on multilateral cooperation 
aiming at international solutions to the Iranian nuclear issue while other issues took the place of 
previous security concerns. In 2006 discussions regarding the Iranian nuclear program remained 
most frequent, accounting for 44% of the discourse and, while both Iraq and the MEPP almost 
completely disappeared as bases for international interaction. Similarly, bilateral concerns also 
diminished and formed only 10% of the references in the texts. At the same time, two additional 
issues emerged as topics of interest that would remain through the next years: energy and 
democracy. Dialogue related to energy concerns, the result of Russia-Ukraine disagreements, 
appeared in 11% of French statements, while discussions related to Russian democracy increased 
to a noticeable level in 2006 of 11%. 
Similar emphases appeared in 2007. While declining in absolute terms in 2007, rhetoric 
related to Iran remained dominant at 40% of the total references. After declining the previous 
year, bilateral concerns became highly salient in 2007, appearing in 29% of the discourse. 
Despite the resolution of the gas crisis the previous year, energy issues increased in prominence 
to 16% of the discourse. Finally, democracy discussions continued at a noticeable level, which 
would be expected given the elections held in Russia that year. 
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The preeminent concern in the discourse of 2008 naturally became the war in Georgia but 
only during the latter half of the year. Moreover, its dominance lasted a relatively short time, 
with most of the discussion on Georgia occurring between August and October. Prior to and 
shortly after the conflict, French dialogue consisted of the same topics as previous years: energy, 
Iran, democracy, and bilateral topics. While the relative frequency of statements concerning these 
subjects decline due to the Russo-Georgian, the raw number of segments remained similar to the 
previous year with the exception of bilateral references.  Similarly, discourse related to EU-
Russia relations appeared frequently (19%) as a result of both the conflict as well as the fact that 
President Sarkozy also held the Presidency of the European Union for the latter half of the year. 
Subsequent years likewise continued the overall pattern. France’s rhetoric during 2009 
once again focused most often on the Iran nuclear issue which accounted for only 22% of 
references while Georgia remained a salient topic that constituted 19% of the discourse. Both 
EU-Russia relations and energy concerns represented other significant bases of discussion as 
well during the time period, equally salient at 14%. In 2010, The subject of Iran’s nuclear 
program again dominated French-Russian interactions, increasing to 31% of the dialogue. At the 
same time, previous multinational considerations such as energy and EU-Russia relations 
essentially disappeared. In their place, attention to the bilateral relationship resumed a significant 
place in the discourse (21%) while dialogue about the situation in Georgia remained noticeable at 
10% of the dialogue.  
Beginning in 2011, French discourse reflected a distinct turn toward reactions to various 
crises at the expense of European and bilateral concerns. Attention in the Middle East soon 
shifted from Iran to Syria, requiring the focus of both France and Russia resulting in a change 
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priority in their discourse. In addition, international deliberations regarding events in Libya 
emerged to a noticeable degree. The civil war that erupted in Syria in 2011 became the 
predominant issue around which Franco-Russian discourse centered for the next three years. In 
the first year 44% of the discourse related to Syria with bilateral interactions accounting for 
another 13%. Concurrently, the instability in Libya presented the only other notable topic in 
French dialogue with Russia, appearing in 10% of quoted segments. However, the following 
year, 2012, was overwhelmingly dominated by a focus on Syria as the civil war heated up and 
accusations of the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime drew heightened criticism from 
western European countries. Franco-Russian dialogue in 2012 consisted of 82% Syrian discourse 
while references to democracy reemerged to a noticeable level at 10% due to the Russian 
elections held that year. The overwhelming salience of to the Syrian conflict left little room for 
other topics.  
Subsequent years found even greater amount of attention paid to crises, pushing out 
virtually every other concern. In 2013, the conflict in Syria again represented 82% of French-
Russia discourse. The only other noticeable issue was related to Ukraine which constituted only 
9% of the dialogue. The final year under consideration brought about the greatest salience related 
to a single topic as the various crises in Ukraine unfolded. Rhetoric related to them formed 90% 
of the French discourse in 2014, with an assortment of previously discussed areas constituting a 
relatively insignificant number of references, led by Syria with five quotations. 
The issues that emerge from Franco-Russian dialogue generate responses from foreign 
policy decision makers.  As discussed, the preeminent issues vary slightly over time but the 
relationship between France and Russia most frequently related to international crises in the 
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middle east to which both countries responded as outside entities.  The conflicts in Georgia and 
Ukraine disrupted this pattern and bilateral concerns, usually an undercurrent in the discourse, 
occasionally gained a prominent place in the rhetoric.  The way that policy makers discuss their 
relationship with Russia within these contexts will reveal the motivations for their actions. 
In their own words: French foreign policy motivations 
Building off the foundations of the previously discussed issues, I now move to examine French 
foreign policy discourse with an eye on the underlying motivations of their relations and 
responses to Russia. I will use these factors to make inferences about the considerations that 
inform French foreign policy choices.  
Figure 4 below depicts the frequency of codes as they appeared in French texts between 
2003 and 2014 corresponding to the theoretical perspectives and alternative explanations for 














Figure 4 — Theoretical perspectives in French discourse (% total annual discourse)
relate to the overarching framework to simplify the discussion and to align them with the 
hypotheses. Subsequent figures will break down each viewpoint into greater detail. 
Rhetoric reflecting realist considerations of systemic conditions appears at varying levels 
over time in French foreign policy discourse toward Russia as shown in Figure 5. In this regard, 
references to the polarity of the international system and the identification of relative power 
positions of various states (particularly Russia) demonstrate an impetus for action in light of 
these factors on the part of French foreign policy actors.  
For most of the period covered in this study, French discussions contained few references 
to Russia as a great power. Nevertheless, they appeared consistently over time and the dialogue 
never demonstrated a concern stemming from Russia’s position in the system. Michel Barnier, 
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Minister of Foreign Affairs, offered his perspective on Lithuanian TV in 2005: “Russia is a very 
great country…It is a great country and a great people, a great world power.” (2005b) This 
discourse increased in the years surrounding the Georgia conflict, peaking in 2009 and 
dominating all other realist concerns that year. Following the G8 summit in 2007, discussing the 
lack of consensus among United Nations Security Council members, President Sarkozy 
remarked, “I believe in the role of Russia. Russia is a great power…” (2007).  And again in 2010, 
he commented, “I have never been one of those who fears the emergence of new powers such as 
China, India, Russia or even Brazil. I believe on the contrary that [their] development…is an 
opportunity for the world.” (2010)  
Alongside the discussions of power, French public statements portrayed support and 
respect for Russia’s role in creating an alternate center of power in the international system apart 
from the US. French concern with systemic polarity ebbed and flowed over time with uncertain 
ties to specific issues, although, in general, as time passed French references to the Russian 
impact on the distribution of power in the system declined. Early on in the time period under 
investigation, France frequently mentioned the change in the polarity of the international system, 
which became the most prominent realist discourse in 2004 and 2007. Moreover, this change was 
welcomed on their part as they advocated for a multipolar system to replace what they saw as a 
unipolar system dominated by the United States. A new distribution of power would include 
regional powers such as China and Brazil as well as Europe and Russia as described by the 
French prime minister in February, 2003: 
“The world cannot rest on the support of only one power. The world needs different poles 
of stability. We need a multipolar world. And Europe constitutes, without a doubt, along 
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with the United States, the most important pole of stability, able to provide direction. In 
order to work well, it is necessary to walk on two legs and we see in this the role that 
China, Russia, and many other regions of the world play. (De Villepin, 2003a) 
This statement reflects the opposition that France along with Russia (and Germany) 
displayed toward the American moves toward military action in Iraq. In 2005, when asked if it 
were necessary to counter the dominance of the United States, the French foreign minister 
Barnier rejected framing his discussions in that manner, although he acknowledged the existence 
or emergence of additional world powers.  
Q - Is it necessary to balance against American power? 
R - I am not looking to…promote the European project against the United States or in a 
sort of rivalry with the United States, who are our allies and who are the premier power in 
the world but who will not eternally be the only global power. There are other powers 
who are continent-state powers as well such as China or Russia, very near to 
us…” (Barnier, 2004a) 
French policy makers regularly reinforced their support for a multipolar world, specifically 
supporting the notion of Russia as a necessary pole in the system.  
“I believe it is in the fundamental interest of global stability, as well as the stability of our 
region [Europe], that the European Union and Russia, two great bodies, two essential 
elements of the multipolar world of today.” (Chirac, 2005) 
While the discourse appeared less frequently in subsequent years, future policy makers 
continued to advance this perspective. In 2007, rhetoric reflecting Russia as a pole in the system 
emerged frequently. As Foreign Minister Kouchner commented to a Russian newspaper, “It is 
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necessary to understand what is this great country, for Russia is a great country, and the role that 
you play in the world” (Kouchner, 2007b). This reference not only to the country’s greatness but 
also its place in the world highlights the French view of Russia as a major global actor. However, 
the rhetoric changed toward the end of the time period examined with discussions about polarity 
completely disappearing from 2011 onward. In 2014, France no longer specifically encouraged 
movement toward multipolarity but rather seemed concerned with a lack of strength in any 
particular pole. Rather than expressing a vision of multipolarity, Laurent Fabius, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs at the time, lamented the existence of a ‘non-polar’ world where no country, or 
even a group of countries, was able to solve the crises of the day. “Today, in a world that has 
become ‘zero-polar’, no state or group of states [including Russia] can succeed in stabilizing 
crises” (Fabius, 2014c). 
French rhetoric also shows evidence of neoclassical concerns, namely, other concerns 
that mitigate reactions to systemic changes. Rather than seeing Russia as a threat to European 
stability either as a result of increased capability or aggressiveness, French foreign policy makers 
considered Russia to be a necessary partner in achieving their goals related to regional and global 
security as well as a necessary aid in protecting certain shared interests. Moreover, France 
remained deeply aware of the impact that negative interactions with Russia could have on 
European energy security. Figure 3 displays the variations in these focus areas over time. 
While the principle security concerns of the early 2000s focused on the Middle East and 
North Africa, French rhetoric nonetheless routinely highlighted the critical role that Russia 
played in maintaining peace and security in Europe itself. Dialogue of this nature appeared 
regularly between 2003 and 2008 and peaked in 2009. Prime minister Bernard Kouchner 
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remarked in 2005, “France firmly desires the creation of a strategic partnership between the 
European Union and Russia. It will guarantee us economic development and stability of our 
continent” (2005).  A similar discourse manifests itself with regard to Russia’s contributions to 
global security. Just prior to assuming his role as President of the European Union, Nicolas 
Sarkozy commented, “The world has much to gain from a deeper and more systematic 
cooperation between Europe and Russia, notably in matters of defense and security…” (2007). 
Prime minister Bernard Kouchner emphasized the essential role of Russia in regional peace, 
stating “We must first of all meet with Russia in order to stabilize permanently the Balkans and 
relations with Ukraine” (2009b). Furthermore, he noted in an interview with the Russian 
newspaper specifically regarding a visit to Chad to observe EU operations,  
I was able to note at one point the helicopters provided to the European Union by Russia 
having contributed to [the mission’s] success. This operation is an example of the type of 
concrete cooperation in the security domain that is necessary to develop between Europe 
and Russia. (Kouchner, 2009a) 
In addition, France shared other security concerns with Russia such as counter-terrorism and 
counter-proliferation, which found their way into their discourse, minimally in most years but 
noticeably in 2011 and 2012. Prime Minister Bernard Kouchner mentioned with regard to Iran:  
With Russia and China, we are going to bring a text to the Security Council that will 
become, I hope, a United Nations resolution; a binding resolution but also a resolution to 
open up dialogue with Iran. In this we have a common interest with Russia. (2008a) 
The conflict in Georgia did nothing to alter French perspective on Russia’s positive 
contributions in the realm of security. On the contrary, French rhetorical support for cooperation 
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with Russia increased in 2009. Prime Minister Alain Juppé articulated the French perspective: 
“Russian or French, we are all confronted with the same challenges and threats in an evolving 
world. How to improve global governance, how to combat terrorism, proliferation, and illicit 
traffic…such are the true questions presenting themselves” (2011b). However, as with other 
security concerns, this discourse went dormant for a period of time (2012-2013) but slightly 
reemerged in the context of the events in Ukraine.  
Energy security followed a slightly different trajectory, peaking in 2009 before 
disappearing, only to reemerge in 2014 at a much lower level and from a different angle.  The 
discourse prior to 2012 focused in the need to cooperate with Russia given their status as the 
primary supplier of gas to Europe. Following intergovernmental talks in 2003, Prime Minister 
Jean-Pierre Raffarin described French-Russian energy cooperation, “Following the state visit of 
President Putin in February 2003, our two countries adopted a joint declaration on energy, and 
my coming to Moscow has to do with the priority issue of our bilateral energy 
cooperation” (2003).  Gas crises in both 2006 and 2009 raised the salience of this issue. At the 
end of 2009, Secretary of State for European Affairs, Pierre Lellouche, revealed the French 
perspective on the role that Russia played in European energy security:  
[I]t is necessary to work together in order to multiply the links with Ukraine and reduce 
tensions with the Russians, obviously in the matter of gas. We must be conscious of the 
potential risks for Europe in the matter of energy dependence and, from this perspective, 
it is necessary to develop new relations with Russia…” (2009) 
Despite EU actions to increase energy security following previous crises, in 2014 the 
French focus shifted from seeking cooperation with Russia to finding an alternate source to 
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Russian gas in order to reduce the European vulnerability to Russia. Laurent Fabius noted the 
need for the European Union to take lessons from the events in Crimea. Citing European 
dependence on Russian gas, he asserted,  
We must reduce our dependence [on Russian gas] and together create a European energy 
strategy. For example, if we diversify our energy sources, if we group our purchases to 
obtain the best price, this will be positive four our households and our businesses. This is 
the politics that we must put forward. (Fabius, 2014b) 
Moving away from realist foundations, I next examine the prevalence of institutional 
discourse. As demonstrated in the previous section, opportunities for multilateral action 
abounded as the corresponding level of dialogue reflects (Figure 6).  
With the exception of the years of Russian interventions (2008 and 2014), discussions 
related to multilateralism dominated French discourse in terms of raw numbers of references. In 
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the periods of greatest international disagreements multilateral rhetoric constituted an inordinate 
amount of the overall French foreign policy statements. More specifically, in 2003 this topic was 
found in 70% of French discussions related to Russia while in 2013 the number increased to 
86%. At the same time, the raw numbers do not reflect the nature of Franco-Russian relations 
from a multilateral context. This total masks the change in tone over time with respect to French 
and Russian interactions, ignoring the fact that over time the French orientation changed from 
praise for collaboration to frustration with lack of cooperation. 
As discussed above, several crises across the Middle East drew attention of most 
international actors, including France and Russia. Related to these events, French foreign policy 
makers depicted Russia as a critical partner in resolving most of these situations, including the 
UN efforts to halt or prevent Iraq’s WMD program and Iran’s nuclear development. In the years 
2003-2006, the French discourse clearly depicted Russia as a partner in multilateral solutions. 
Early evidence of cooperation came in regard to dealing with Iraq’s WMD program. 
Close to 90% of the people of the world share the sentiment that force can be used only 
as the last resort. Have we tried everything in Iraq? We think no. This is why we have 
made the proposals in the memorandum [concerning a new inspection regime], in 
coordination with the Russians and the Germans…in order to allow the international 
community to have a tool against the risk of proliferation… (de Villepin, 2003b) 
The rhetoric of French policy makers with respect to the Iranian crisis depicted a similar 
attitude, as demonstrated by Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy: 
If the international community is united, China and Russia with us, [Iran will be isolated]. 
In my opinion, this is the solution to the conflict. If, inversely, the Chinese and the 
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Russians, the international community are not united, this would represent an exemplary 
freedom for the Iranians to continue, for they are looking for divisions among the 
international community. (2006a) 
At the same time, while delegating their own involvement in the MEPP to the EU, France 
continually portrayed Russia as a key player in the Quartet which was working toward peace 
between Israel and the Palestinians. State Minister for European Affairs Noelle Lenoir noted,  
We think that the way to peace cannot be one of military rule. That is the reason for 
which we ardently wish a restart of the Roadmap, which is not Europe’s but which is that 
of the Quartet - Russia, the United Nations, the United States and Europe. That is the 
only way. (2004) 
After being overtaken by other issues, concern over the MEPP again emerged to minimal 
level of attention in 2011. Regarding the possibility of a Palestinian state, a French official 
commented, “we wish that the so-called Quartet, that is to say the Americans, the Russians, the 
United Nations would ask their partners to return to the table for discussions.” (Juppé, 2011a). 
The years 2007-2010, showed a decline in multilateral rhetoric, although no concern or 
opposition to Russian efforts in the this context arose, despite the Russo-Georgian war in 2008. 
As seen in regard to other themes, this conflict does not seem to have inordinately affected 
French attitudes toward Russia. French rhetoric pertaining to the crisis in Libya also 
acknowledged the role played by Russia in addressing the situation in Libya as seen in the 
description of international reactions to an arms embargo, travel restrictions, and especially trial 
before the international criminal court:  
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This has never happened before in international diplomacy. China agrees, Russia has 
agreed, the United States has agreed, the countries of the European Union have agreed. 
Therefore, this signifies that today Khadafi is under a mandate of the international 
criminal court where he will realize what he is doing (i.e., violating the rights of his 
citizens). (Wauquiez, 2011) 
However, French orientation toward Russia changed dramatically beginning in 2011 as 
clear differences with respect to handling the Syrian crisis arose. While still seeking solutions in 
a collaborative manner, France became much more confrontational toward Russia between 
2011-2013 with a significant overall negative trend in the rhetoric that never recovered. Their 
frustration with Russia’s unwillingness to compromise or embrace coordinated resolution 
appeared in statements such as this by Foreign Minister Alain Juppé: “It is unfortunate that we 
have not managed to reach a majority in the Security Council; Russia and China have vetoed a 
resolution, however modest, that merely asks the Syrian regime to cease its repression.” (2011c) 
The second Russian intervention into Crimea in 2014 elicited fewer reactions from a multilateral 
perspective than issues in Syria. As discussed below, other issues came to the fore during that 
conflict. 
Rhetoric reflecting liberal explanations of foreign policy are based on the preferences of 
powerful domestic actors such as ideologically-minded interest groups, economic concerns, and/
or political elites. In the texts, discourse reflecting these interests appears as discussions of 
interstate trade, multifaceted interdependence, and Russia’s transition to a modern, liberal state, 
as shown in Figure 7. When combined, liberal topics formed a noticeable proportion of the 
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discussions during the first half of the years examined but decreased to a trickle by the latter 
years considered. Subsequently, rhetoric reflecting liberal themes trailed all or most others.  
As major trading partners, France and Russia could be expected to cooperate to avoid 
losses associated with the disruption of economic ties. French rhetoric demonstrates an interest 
over time in their economic relationship with Russia and highlights their desire to promote trade 
and economic development between them. The most frequent references to bilateral economic 
relations came in 2006, when discourse reflecting liberal perspectives formed 19% of the 
quotations, second only to multilateralism. Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin responded to 
questions about economic ties between France and Russia by saying, “Our presence in Russia is 
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important, with 400 companies set up, existing partnerships, and some model operations.” (2006) 
Later that year, in discussing the state of democracy in Russia, Foreign Minister Douste-Blazy 
encouraged patience and reminded his audience that Russia “plays a major role in our economic 
plan today.” In the same interview, he commented, “with [economic] powers such as Russia…we 
clearly have an interest in opening up our trade and our market economy…” (2006) This 
discourse maintained a noticeable presence through 2011 before completely disappearing 
beginning in 2012.  
Similarly, rhetoric related to interdependence based on multiple areas of cooperation, 
such as joint interests in space, communications, transportation, military materiel, and cultural 
exchanges, maintained a noticeable presence in the early years of this study before declining and 
eventually disappearing in the most recent time periods. After steadily increasing beginning in 
2004, discourse related to interdependence peaked in 2007. Foreign Minister Douste-Blazy 
summed up the French perspective in an interview with Russian media outlet ITAR-TASS: 
“Beyond energy and aviation, we have many other major cooperation projects: …digital 
television, transport infrastructures (toll roads), and railways (high-speed trains).” (2007) Later 
that year, President Sarkozy, again before a Russian audience, praised Franco-Russian 
collaboration across multiple sectors, including launching Russian rockets from the French 
launch pad in Guyana and the joint production of the Sukoi superjet 100, highlighting that it 
“opens investment opportunities for French companies in Russia, but also opens them for 
Russian companies in France.” (2007) While France and Russia continued to work together in 
these areas, rhetoric related to interdependence appeared very infrequently from 2008 onward 
and disappeared completely in 2012 and 2013.  
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French discourse also included references to Russia’s modernization or transition to a 
liberal democracy. While containing rhetoric related to Russian domestic politics, these texts 
explicitly incorporate multiple aspects of liberalism, specifically pointing to the combination of 
political and economic changes in Russia. As seen in the discussions reflecting other liberal 
themes, French statements from this perspective appear in early years before disappearing 
entirely. Foreign Minister de Villepin noted  
[Russia] is a country in transition, that has known in recent years…an extremely 
considerable evolution…in the sense of opening, of putting in place a democratic system, 
of reform. Per capita income has increased, an overhaul of the law has been undertaken, 
the economy was liberalized and opened to the outside. (2004) 
At the same time, constructivist explanations of French foreign policy based on domestic 
characteristics such as culture or values or the influence of international norms also find support 
in the texts.  As seen regarding previous theoretical approaches, the discourse reveals regular 
reference to themes associated with this approach, as shown in Figure 8. 
While rhetoric reflecting the influence of internationally accepted state action abounds, 
references to the idea of identity appears infrequently, however, in the rhetoric. Explicit 
references to a sense of shard traits are rare. In response a question about “where Europe ends” in 
the context of EU enlargement in 2003, Minister of European Affairs Noelle Lenoir comments 
that Russia is “obviously European, but not a candidate [for the EU]”  (2003). In 2008, Foreign 
Minister Bernard Kouchner similarly clearly identified Russia as part of Europe. In a discussion 
with a Russian newspaper concerning emerging economies, he made a clear distinction between 
countries such as Brazil and India, nations with no history of modernization, and Russia, a 
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country that forms part of the developed world but also “has another history, that is, as a 
European country” (2008b). Of note, each explicit reference to Russia’s identity occurred prior to 
its intervention in Georgia in 2008. Subsequent to that time, no discussion of this idea appears in 
any text, although the tacit difference remains. Some discourse revealed in the texts shows a 
hesitancy on the part of French policy makers to include Russia in “Europe”, reinforcing the 
notion that French policy makers see Russia as distinctly different. For example, when 
discussing EU enlargement, the French Minister of State for European Affairs noted, “today we 
[the EU] have a vision [of Europe] that does not permit us to include in this perspective for the 
long term Ukraine, Moldova, Byelorussia or Russia or the countries of the Caucasus” (2007). 
Similarly, an implicit characterization of Russia as something other than European pervades the 
dialogue.  As much as French policy makers desire to cooperate with Russia on a host of matters, 
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the discourse demonstrates a clear separation between Russia and western European countries. 
The rhetoric reflects Russian cooperation with “Europe”, but is not part of Europe itself.  
Another constructivist perspective accounts for French foreign policy by looking at the 
international norms defining expectations for certain kinds of actions from states with a given 
identity. French policy makers expected Russia, as a great power, to adhere to accepted standards 
of behavior such as the maintenance of human rights and conforming to international law. The 
texts reveal a striking rarity of references to normative concerns for the majority of the time 
under consideration, with the exception of human rights discussions. Alternatively, during the 
conflict years, rhetoric reflecting other normative considerations such as international law, state 
sovereignty and integrity, and the responsibilities incumbent upon being a great power appear in 
great numbers. 
The pattern of human rights discussions differs from appearances of other ideational 
concerns in that they appear in response to issues beyond Russian interventions. Prior to 2006, 
human rights dialogue appears infrequently in the discourse; however, references increased in 
2006 and peaked in 2007 based on concerns about the Russian treatment of opposition figures 
and reactions to violence in Chechnya. Responding to a question regarding upcoming meetings 
with his counterpart in Moscow, Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner insisted that he would 
certainly bring up human rights issues. “The question of human rights, that with respect to the 
law of property or freedom of the press seems to us particularly concerning.” (2007a) he noted. 
Human rights rhetoric remained prominent in 2008, equally split between the occurrences pre- 
and post-war. While the discourse for most of the year continued to focus on internal Russian 
political issues, the dialogue emerging from the Russo-Georgian war focused exclusively on 
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meeting the needs of the affected civilian population within Georgia. In the midst of the conflict, 
Foreign Minister Kouchner asserted, “It is necessary to stop the bombardments of the civilian 
population. We must tell the Russian that it is not possible to continue in this way [i.e. bombing 
civilians]” (2008c). In the years following, human rights rhetoric essentially disappears, with 
only a few references related to the humanitarian situation in Syria in 2013 and none pertaining 
to Ukraine in the following year. 
Discourse based on other normative concerns such as international law, territorial 
integrity, and sovereignty appeared almost exclusively in relation to Russian interventions in 
Georgia and Ukraine. References to international law shared the top spot in 2008 with human 
rights dialogue. Jean-Pierre Jouyet, the Minister of State for European Affairs, argued “this 
Russian decision [to invade Georgia] constitutes a violation of the fundamental principles of 
international law…” (2008). While not the most prominent in 2014, this perspective appeared 
frequently, reflecting similar concerns as before: “there are things that we cannot allow. That a 
country puts its hands on a region of another country, as happened in Crimea, is totally contrary 
to international law” (Fabius, 2014b). 
Concerns about territorial integrity likewise constituted a significant portion of the 
rhetoric in these years, appearing slightly less often than international law in 2008 before 
becoming the most salient perspective in 2014. In response to questions about the French 
perspective regarding the situation in Georgia, Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner commented, 
“all the member states of the European Union are committed to the territorial integrity and the 
sovereignty of Georgia, and moreover, all the members of the international community must 
respect it” (2008d). Similar discussions appear early in 2009 as well due to the continuing effects 
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of the war in Georgia. In the later conflict, the discourse demonstrated the same concern, as 
expressed by Laurent Fabius, the Minister of Foreign Affairs: “our attitude throughout this crisis 
has been to stand firm [against Russia], because we cannot accept that the integrity of a country, 
in this case Ukraine, is flouted” (2014a). 
A similar pattern appeared in discussions about the responsibilities incumbent upon 
Russia as a member of the international community namely what kind of behavior is appropriate 
for a major power to exhibit. While never specifically articulated, the following expectations 
appear through the discourse: states should fulfill commitments, notably terms of mutually 
agreed-upon cease fires; 2) states should promote justice and abide by the rule of law 
(particularly relevant to the MH17 investigation); and 3) states should not intervene in the 
domestic affairs of other states. Much of the rhetoric subsequent to the negotiated cease-fire in 
August 2008 centered around the expectation that Russia should fulfill its agreed-upon 
withdrawal of troops from Georgia. As Bernard Kouchner commented to a Polish audience in 
September, “Russia must understand that it must respect its commitments and its 
responsibilities.” (2008e) This attitude emerged in 2014 as well. When questioned concerning the 
sale of the French ship Mistral to Russia, the Secretary of State for European Affairs claimed that 
the sale remained contingent on “a certain number of Russian responsibilities” (Désir, 2014) 
related to the investigation of the crash of Malaysian Airline flight MH17 and the management of 
the crisis in Ukraine. In addition to expectations that Russia would fulfill its obligations, French 
policy makers portrayed Russian actions as contrary to the accepted international standard of 
non-intervention. Regarding the Ukrainian crisis, the French foreign minister clearly 
demonstrated the French perspective: “When a country sends military forces into another country 
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without permission and even contrary to the desires of the other country, it is called an 
intervention and obviously this is not acceptable” (Fabius, 2014f). 
Closely related to discussions about international law and territorial integrity, rhetoric 
concerning the need to maintain the norm of state sovereignty also appeared with respect to 
Russian interventions. While noticeable, these references were not as frequent as the previous 
themes. Nevertheless, they reinforce the general attention to normative issues. In response to the 
Russo-Georgian war, Jean-Pierre Jouyet, the Secretary of State for European Affairs, asserted 
“This Russian decision constitutes a violation of [Georgian] sovereignty.” (2008) Subsequently, 
in 2014 Prime Minister Laurent Fabius similarly argued, “we must obviously say, in particular to 
the Russians, that the sovereignty of each country must be respected. We respect Russian 
sovereignty; the Russians must respect Ukrainian sovereignty.” (2014d) 
Lastly, French foreign policy makers’ statements regularly reflected a concern with 
peaceful conflict resolution. While various perspectives support support this goal, French 
rhetoric reflects a normative bias, meaning that their foreign policy decision makers believe that 
violence is an inappropriate means of dealing with disagreements. In its place, politics and 
diplomacy represent the acceptable means of overcoming differences. This theme appeared only 
once in 2008 but more frequently in 2014. With respect to the conflict in Georgia, French policy 
makers insisted on stopping the war in order to focus on political solutions as the then-Minister 
of Foreign Affairs commented that he and President Sarkozy had been working daily “with our 
European partners, the United States as well as with Russia and Georgia, to determine a common 
strategy to convince the Georgian authorities and the leaders of South Ossetia to return to the 
path of negotiations,” blaming the conflict on the inability of the parties to reach a way out of the 
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frozen conflict and preferring to increase tensions and resort to violence” (Kouchner, 2008d). In 
other words, the dialogue contrasts the use of force currently being employed with diplomacy 
and negotiation as an acceptable means of resolving differences.  Similar rhetoric appeared in 
2014. French discourse repeatedly highlighted the need for discussion and political solutions to 
the conflict in Ukraine. Harlem Désir succinctly depicted France’s position with respect to 
Ukraine: “This has been the French attitude from the beginning: firmness and dialogue in order 
to find a political solution” (2014). 
Lastly, with regard to the final theoretical approach, references to democracy appeared 
regularly in French discourse with respect to Russia, as Figure 9 illustrates. This issue comprised 
a substantial yet never dominant place in the concerns of French policy makers.  
In the early years considered in this study, the French frequently expressed their support 
for the current state or the trajectory of Russian democracy, suggesting either that Russia was 
already a democracy or was on its way to becoming one. In 2004, French Foreign Minister 
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Dominique de Villepin was asked whether he considered Putin a true democrat and leader of 
democratization. He responded, “I am convinced that his engagement in reform and democracy 
is sincere. I think that today he is without doubt the man best placed in Russia to advance the 
process of democratization.” (2004) Subsequent Foreign Ministers conveyed the same sentiment. 
When asked to classify the Russian regime following the elections of 2007, Bernard Kouchner 
firmly asserted, “it is a parliamentary regime” (2008a).  Significant support for Russian 
democracy occurred in 2008; however, all but one reference in that year occurred prior to the 
Russo-Georgian war in August. This is not surprising given that Russian elections took place in 
December 2007 so the increase in dialogue in 2008 merely reflects the interest in French 
reactions to that event. French support for the state of Russian democracy reached its peak in 
2010. Addressing concerns about the sale of the helicopter carrier Mistral to Russia, Bernard 
Kouchner tried to allay the fears that it might be used aggressively against its neighbors, noting 
the evolution of Russian democracy. “The current movement is a democratic 
movement…” (Kouchner, 2010)  he argued, implying pacific effects of liberal representative 
domestic politics.  At the same time, the Russia elections of 2012 yielded no positive reaction 
from French foreign policy makers.  
On the other side of the coin, French rhetoric also contained periodic criticisms or 
expressions of concern with Russian democracy. In 2007, following Russian elections, the 
Secretary of State for European Affairs highlighted accusations of “irregularities” in the Russian 
polls and noted at one point “There is progress to be made” and the following day “there is 
certain room for improvement, to be diplomatic” (Jouyet, 2007). Similar dissatisfaction emerged 
again following the subsequent round of Russian elections in 2012. In a similar effort to 
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euphemize, Alain Juppé reflected that “the election was not exemplary;” the best that he could 
come up with was that, while there were tensions, there was no brutal repression (Juppé, 2012a)
—not an especially affirming assertion. In another interview a couple days later, he further noted 
that “the elections were held under questionable conditions” (2012b) 
Preeminent discourses — tracing the most salient French rhetoric over time 
As illustrated above, the discourse reflecting the various theoretical perspectives appear 
to various degrees across the time period examined. Having looked at the issues and the trends of 
theoretically-derived themes over time, I now compare their salience over time by looking at the 
frequency of specific issues per year, which serves as the foundation for considering specifically 
the motivations behind particular French actions in response to Russian interventions in Georgia 
and Ukraine. Figure 10 provides an overview of the number of references annually by category. 
While multilateralist themes reflecting an institutionalist explanation dominated in most years, 
rhetoric evincing each of the theoretical perspectives likewise appears across the range of years 
examined. 
The years before Russian intervention in Georgia contain a dominant presence of 
discourse reflecting the institutionalist perspective connected to attempts to solve various crises 
in the Middle East. French rhetoric clearly establishes a preference for coordinated international 
action through both formal and informal institutions. In 2003 France focused on problems in 
both Iraq and Palestine/Israel. The multilateral concentration continued in future years primarily 
based on Iranian nuclear activities. In 2003 and 2004 both realist perspectives appeared in 
significant amounts of the discourse which suggests a lingering influence of the conflict over 
how to respond in Iraq. Discourse related to polarity reflects the defense of French opposition to 
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the US and alignment with Russia (and Germany) as suggested by neorealist theory. At the same 
time, dialogue reflecting liberal concerns appears as often as realist discussions in 2003 lending 
credence to explanations that focus on interdependence. In this case, France and Russia 
demonstrate mutual dependence in areas of economy, security, and energy among others. 
Furthermore, constructivist rhetoric appeared as frequently, related to a number of disconnected 
topics before disappearing completely in 2004. The subject of democracy was completely absent 
in 2003 before emerging at a moderate level in 2004.  
As the focus of Russia-France relations shifted from Iraq to Iran and the MEPP in 2005, 
the preeminent discourse remained while some issues decreased in frequency. The continued 
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overwhelming focus on multilateral cooperation reinforces the institutionalist expectations. 
Neoclassical realist rhetoric became slightly more salient as French policy makers expressed 
support for Russia as a positive force in maintaining regional and global security. While the 
discussions in 2006 again reflected a focus on finding multilateral solutions to the Iranian nuclear 
issue, French policy makers dialogue related to liberal perspectives such as bilateral economic 
relations increased. Based primarily on energy issues, evidence of neoclassical realist 
perspectives remains noticeable. At the same time, references to systemic considerations 
disappeared almost entirely, which could be explained by a neorealist understanding suggesting 
that previous moves aligning Russia and France reestablished balance in the system, requiring no 
additional balancing behavior. French foreign policy statements in 2007 demonstrated greater 
attention to previously less salient concerns while the predominant issues remained despite 
decrease in focus. Reflecting concern with international security issues, discourse consistent with 
institutional expectations remained while energy concerns bolstered the occurrences of 
neoclassical realist-related rhetoric. At the same time, events within Russia such as violence in 
Chechnya and elections, led to dialogue related to both constructivist and democratic peace 
approaches. After peaking the previous year, support for Russian democracy declined while 
concerns about it emerged for the first time. Furthermore, discussions of Russian power and 
systemic polarity returned to a noticeable level in 2007.  
Things changed dramatically in 2008, for obvious reasons. While multilateralism most 
salient overall, rhetoric consistent with constructivist expectations jumped dramatically and 
became almost equally noticeable. Furthermore, beginning in August, this discourse 
overwhelmingly dominated. Since the conflict in Georgia did not occur until August, much of the 
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year was focused on other issues, particularly continued concern with Iran yielding a significant 
amount of discussions reflecting institutionalist considerations. Once the fighting began in 
Georgia, however, statements primarily manifested constructivist themes. At the same time, the 
conflict also contributed to the multilateral dialogue. At the same time, realist-related rhetoric 
concerned with regional security also found prominence. Furthermore, continuing previous 
patterns, French policy makers’ statements portraying Russian democracy in a favorable light 
reached its highest point in 2008 while expressions of concern about Russian democracy, which 
had been highest in 2007, began a two-year decline. 
For the first time in the years examined in this study, multilateralism did not dominate the 
discourse in 2009. Instead, references to themes related to neoclassical realist explanations, 
especially energy security and regionally security, became preeminent, despite the fact that Iran 
as an issue commanded the most attention. Liberal issues reemerged in the discourse while 
constructivist issues almost completely disappeared. Of note, statements reflecting a neorealist 
perspective appeared again in the discourse which is surprising given the absence of issues that 
would indicate a change in systemic conditions. Furthermore, from a neorealist approach, 
continued support for Russia runs contrary to the fact that Russia had just initiated its military 
modernization program, increasing its relative power.  
The following years returned multilateralism to its position of prominence, practically 
monopolizing the rhetoric in the years leading up to the Ukraine conflict. The pattern prior to the 
Russo-Georgian war continued into 2010 while security concerns faded slightly and multilateral 
references regained their place at the top of the dialogical heap as discussions about Iran’s 
nuclear program increased. Democracy was the next most salient discourse and was entirely 
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positive in orientation. The subsequent years, 2011-13, brought about steeper changes in the 
priority of the issues as significant concerns surfaced related to the emerging and strengthening 
civil war in Syria. While the rhetoric centering on the ideas of multilateralism remained 
prominent, the tone changed from cooperation to opposition. Instead of discussing ways that 
France and Russia cooperated, French policy makers expressed their disappointments in Russian 
disregard for coordinated solutions to the conflict in Syria. Despite the decline in French-Russian 
cooperation and Russian increase in influence in Syria, statements consistent with realist 
perspectives such as increases in threats fails to appear in any statements. Beyond the 
disproportionately dominant discourse focused on institutional considerations in these years, 
evidence related to other viewpoints appeared very infrequently. Cooperation reflecting 
neoclassical realist explanations appeared more frequently than any other secondary issues in 
2011 as French policy makers also discussed Russian contributions to various regional security 
issues, albeit outside a multinational context. Similarly, 2012 brought increased French 
discussions about Russian democracy in light of the elections there. Although support remained, 
it was weak and statements expressing concern increased. In 2013 constructivist discourse 
returned to a slight degree, focusing on French appeals to Russia to assist in resolving the 
disintegration in Syria along the lines of international law and responsibilities as a member of the 
United Nations Security Council. 
For obvious reasons, 2014 shows another significant reorientation of French discourse. 
As seen in 2008, the rhetoric reveals a dramatic shift toward themes associated with 
constructivist perspective in response to Russian actions in Ukraine, including Crimea and the 
eastern provinces, highlighting violations of international norms and calling for Russian 
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compliance with them. Multilateral references remained a noticeable dimension but, as seen in 
the discussions in previous years focused on Syria, France’s policy makers expressed 
disappointment with Russian cooperation with other states, although a modicum of positive 
dialogue remained about Russian actions with respect to Iran. At the same time, rhetoric 
reflecting neoclassical realist explanations increased to the same level as institutional 
considerations based on French leaders’ continued belief in the need for Russian help in 
maintaining regional security. As in 2013, references, both positive or negative, to democracy 
remained absent from the discourse, as did liberal issues related to economy and other forms of 
cooperation. 
Discussion — assessing the France findings 
To what extent do these frequencies of references to various aspects of the world and French 
relations with Russia tell us anything about French foreign policy decision-making? As 
mentioned earlier, competing theoretical approaches offer plausible explanations to account for 
the different French responses to the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 and Russian interventions in 
Crimea and Ukraine proper in 2014. France did not support EU sanctions against Russia in 2008, 
whereas in 2014 it supported a packet of sanctions against Russia business interests and 
individuals. Using the tools of discourse analysis, I subjected a number of alternative 
explanations of states’ foreign policy to empirical tests. Identifying the predominant discourse 
serves as the starting point for the analysis; identifying the most salient rhetoric from each time 
period and comparing them will be the factor to consider in identifying the causes of French 
foreign policy choices. However, it will not suffice to consider merely the salience of discourse 
related to the specific cases. Given the change in policy decisions (the dependent variable), it is 
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necessary to note the differences, that is to say the increase or decrease, in amount of rhetoric and 
compare that with the expectations laid out in the possible explanations.  
Table 5 offers a snapshot of change between 2008 and 
2014 in terms of emphasis of issues during the year of 
conflict according to frequency. A ‘—’sign indicates that 
the salience of themes associated with a particular 
theoretical perspective declined; a ‘+’ indicates an 
increase in the frequency of a set of themes, and = 
indicates no change over time. 
Hypothesis 1 argued that changes in systemic conditions 
led to alternative foreign policy reactions.  However, the 
rhetoric failed to conform to the expectations of realist-inspired explanations. As mentioned 
earlier, a neorealist explanation suggests that the conflict in Ukraine presented a more significant 
change in the balance of power, either regionally or globally, as Russia grew in its capabilities by 
acquiring more territory (Crimea) as well as securing a greater presence in the Black Sea. This 
led to the expectation that dialogue reflecting structural concerns should be higher in 2014 than 
in 2008, when in fact the data show just the opposite. French rhetoric exhibited twice as much 
concern with issues such as polarity and great power status in 2008 as in 2014. Thus the texts do 
not demonstrate a change in French foreign policy behavior based on structural concerns and 
hypothesis 1 must be rejected. 
Similarly, the neoclassical realists’ focus on mitigations to systemic impulses fail to 














on expectations of changes in elite perceptions about the level or Russian threat or the mitigating 
pressures of shared security concerns, neoclassical realists would expect to see a decrease in 
prominence of corresponding rhetoric between 2008 and 2014. The data initially reflect support 
for this hypothesis. Comparing the relative frequency of the discourse suggests that neoclassical 
concerns were more prominent in 2008 than in 2014, which would have led to a change in 
behavior. Specifically, being more concerned with factors beyond Russia’s increased power in 
the region in 2008, French foreign policy makers opted to avoid confrontation. On the other 
hand, as such concerns became less prominent, they were more free to oppose Russia, resulting 
in support for sanctions. Therefore, initial consideration suggests that hypothesis two cannot be 
rejected.  
Institutional rhetoric, as highlighted in hypothesis three, appears in French discourse 
frequently over time, demonstrating a regular preference on the part of elites for solutions to 
conflicts based on international consensus.  An institutionalist account initially demonstrates a 
theoretically consistent decrease in priority between 2008 and 2014.  During the former year, 
multilateral references represented the preeminent discourse while in the latter discussions 
reflecting institutional considerations markedly trailed themes consistent with a constructivist 
perspective.  Consequently, hypothesis three cannot be rejected.  
As highlighted in hypothesis four, a liberal perspective contends that French rhetoric 
would demonstrate decreased concern over time with issues of economics and interdependence.  
More specifically, that it would be more reserved in its reactions to Russian interventions when 
trade and bilateral relationships assumed a high priority while decision makers would take a 
more confrontational stance in the event that they were less concerned about their economic 
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relationship with Russia. As an initial discourse reveals, French statements related to this 
bilateral relationship remained relevant in 2008 but had disappeared prior to 2014, as predicted. 
Consequently, France’s support for sanctions in 2014 might be explained by a decline in concern 
about the impact on mutual trade benefits and therefore this hypothesis cannot be rejected.  
Hypothesis five suggests that changes in perceptions of shared identity can explain 
French policy makers’ different responses.  However, as noted before references to a common 
“Europeanness” are infrequent and disappear prior to the outbreak of the Russo-Georgian war.  
The discourse reveals no influence of these factors on policy choices.  Therefore, hypothesis five 
can be rejected. 
Foreign policy concerns informed by constructivist expectation about state action based 
on adherence to or enforcement of international norms such as international law, territorial 
integrity, sovereignty, and human rights appear significantly only in the conflict periods. In both 
2008 and 2014, their dialogue shifts dramatically from previous years to concentrate on 
normative issues. Rather than depicting their relationship with Russia as a shared need to reach 
multilateral solutions as in most years, French policy makers turned the focus on issues of 
international law, sovereignty, and normative state responsibilities. Despite its prominence, this 
discourse cannot however explain diametrically opposed outcomes. As an independent variable, 
it remains the same and by itself cannot therefore offer a reason for a changed dependent 
variable. If constructivist concerns had been absent or less significant in either case, they could 
account for support for or opposition to sanctions in one or other case. This is not what the data 
show however and we must therefore reject hypothesis six. 
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Finally, hypothesis seven maintained that French foreign policy behavior was the result 
of policy makers’ perceptions of the trajectory of Russian democracy. While never a dominant 
theme, rhetoric regarding democracy in Russia manifested a distinct pattern. Despite being a 
regular component of dialogue at the beginning of the period studied, discourse consistent with 
the democratic peace approach had faded away almost completely by the time of Russia’s 
interventions in Ukraine. In fact, Russian elections in 2012 led to a very minor reemergence of 
democracy in the dialogue before disappearing once more. Having decreased dramatically 
between 2008 and 2014, discussions about the state of democracy could also point to a change in 
French foreign policy behavior. A desire to support continued progress of liberal reforms would 
have led to restraint on the part of the French when responding to the Russian war with Georgia. 
Alternatively, the declining support for or attention to Russian domestic politics in 2014 suggests 
a freedom to confront Russia in response to its interventions in Ukraine.  Therefore, this 
hypothesis cannot be rejected either. 
After initial consideration of all potential explanations, four remain: neoclassical realism, 
institutionalism, liberalism, and democratic peace theory. In order to further examine whether 
one or more of these explains the outcomes, I reconsidered the cases based on a narrower focus 
on data from 2008. Having begun in August, the Georgia conflict and responses to it concerned 
only the latter half of 2008, meaning that patterns of relating between the countries continued as 
before for more than half the year. Once the Russo-Georgian war took place, however, a new 
factor emerged that may have effected states interests and priorities. Therefore, looking at the 
rhetoric subsequent to the conflict in 2008 and comparing that with French discourse 
surrounding Ukraine in 2014 offers a better comparison between cases. 
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When considering the specific effects of the conflicts on neoclassical realist-related 
rhetoric, differences between the two cases become less distinct. While the number of 
appearances of this specific rhetoric decreases as noted, the position of these themes with respect 
to the others does not. In both instances, neoclassical realist rhetoric trails only constructivist and 
multilateral references, making it relatively as salient in 2014 as it was in 2008. Moreover, the 
conflicts produced a similar response in each case and, contrary to initial findings, the reaction 
was greater in 2014, in opposition to expectations. In the years prior to the Georgia-Russia 
conflict, concerns over regional and energy security and other shared security interests were a 
regular part of the French discourse. However, following the events of August 2008, this rhetoric 
noticeably increased. Specifically, in 2007 these issues are found in 11 references and in the first 
part of 2008, prior to the war, this discourse emerges in another 4 texts. However, following the 
conflict, the texts reveal ten references to neoclassical realist themes. When considering the 
increase from 2013 to 2014, the jump is even greater. As outlined above, this discourse had 
disappeared by 2013. However, the following year saw it return in eight quotations. While the 
war in Georgia increased an existing dialogue between the states, the events in Ukraine 
reinvigorated a dormant discourse. After fading from focus, energy concerns and attention to 
regional security reemerged as a result of the conflict in Ukraine. Therefore, rather than 
becoming less important between the two conflicts, a closer consideration of neoclassical realist-
related rhetoric suggests that French decision makers were more influenced by such 
considerations in 2014 than in 2008, contrary to expectations. Consequently, hypothesis 2 can be 
rejected. 
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Reconsideration of the institutionalist account yields a similar result.  Prior to August 
2008, themes associated with this perspective dominated the discourse, exceeding all others 
including constructivist-related discussions.  However, following the Russo-Georgian war, 
rhetoric reflecting constructivist dialogue assumes prominence, moving the multilateral down to 
second priority, just as observed in 2014. 
At the same time, as one of the two theoretical perspectives that consists of both a 
positive and a negative component, it is necessary to examine the discourse more closely to see if 
there was a change not only in frequency but also in tone.  As part of this analysis, I broke down 
the rhetoric from 2008 to separate texts prior to and after the Russian intervention in August.  
This separation yielded only 3 of the previous 13 positive and 1 of 2 negative references to 
multilateralism in 2008 as well as 10 of 21 segments discussing EU-Russia cooperation related to 
the time period subsequent to the Russo-Georgian war.  The references for 2014 at first glance 
look noticeably different, demonstrating a greater emphasis on multilateral failures (12/17 total) 
and only one segment related to EU-Russia cooperation.  Initially, the disparity between the 
cases supports the predicted change in institutional commitment.  However, a closer look at the 
texts shows that the majority of the discourse concerned with EU-Russia cooperation in 2008 
relates to the Georgia conflict and reveals French disappointment with Russia’s unwillingness to 
adhere to its commitments outlined in the Six Point Plan just as the texts from 2014 focus on the 
Russian failure to comply with negotiated cease fires.  Each case, then, displays equal emphasis 
and a primarily critical tone toward Russia’s adherence to multilateral solutions.  Consequently, 
consistent with the initial conclusions, more detailed consideration of the institutional 
perspective finds that an explanation based on changes in commitments to multilateralism cannot 
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explain divergent foreign policy behaviors.  Therefore, hypothesis three can ultimately be 
rejected.  
Next, I return to consider the possibility of a liberal, primarily economic, explanations. 
Once again, considering the data more closely with respect to particular conflict periods reveals 
similarities between the cases. After narrowing the period in 2008 to consider only August to 
December, I found an equal focus of liberal discourse during that time as in 2014—and 
minimally at that. Only once in each time period did a French policy maker mention liberal 
considerations at all. In 2008 the other references preceded the conflict which showed a 
significant decrease from the previous year.  By August 2008, discourse reflecting a liberal 
perspective had already decreased to a minimal level just as was evident in 2014.  This allowed 
me to conclude that, in response to each conflict, they exhibited similar in attention (or 
inattention) to liberal concerns. Consequently, despite its initial plausibility, an explanation based 
on liberal concerns with economics and interdependence cannot account for French support for 
or opposition to sanctions and hypothesis four must be rejected. 
Finally, I reconsider the possibility that views of Russian democracy may have influenced 
French foreign policy. As previously mentioned, rhetoric reflecting French perspectives on 
Russian democracy displayed similar patterns as liberal themes. Neither demonstrated a notable 
difference between the two cases and both disappeared almost entirely by 2013. However, unlike 
liberalism, not only did the frequency change but speakers completely altered the tone in the 
rhetoric. All liberal discussions shared the same concern with promoting or protecting French-
Russian economic and/or cultural connections; there were never any negative aspects to this 
relationship. That was not the case with democracy-related language, however. On the contrary, 
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as discussed previously, French rhetoric which began as supportive and positive in relation to 
Russia, eventually became indifferent at best and openly hostile at worst.  
Answering the question about French foreign policy motivations based solely on 
identifying the predominant discourse is insufficient. The French foreign policy texts considered 
in this study lead to a possible conclusion in support of the liberal peace theory. Understandings 
of shared democracy in 2008 led to non-conflictual behavior resulting in a lack of support for 
sanctions while an unfavorable outlook concerning the progress of Russian democracy led to 
confrontational behavior resulting in promotion of European sanctions in 2014. 
Analysis of German Foreign Policy Discourse 
Having considered the French case, I now turn to consider motivations behind German foreign 
policy decisions using the discourse analysis of the German foreign policy makers’ speeches. As 
with the preceding analysis, I start by outlining the texts that contain the rhetoric and review the 
contexts from which they emerge.  Subsequently I highlight the themes reflected in the discourse 
and compare their salience over time.  Finally, I apply the findings to the hypotheses.  
German data sources 
Analyzing German foreign policy required a broader range of sources for the texts compared to 
the French case. Since I do not speak or read German, I could not rely solely on documents 
published on the government websites. Those data sources exist but not for the duration of the 
time period covered in this study. Robust English-only documentation emerges only in 2010. 
Some forms of communication are available prior to that time but do not offer a sufficient 
number of texts. To supplement officially published documents, I had to rely on media sites as 
well as other websites. 
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Both the office of the Chancellor  and the Federal Foreign Office  provide a wealth of 9 10
documents on their websites in both German and English and likewise have search functions to 
concentrate on particular topics. For each of these sites, searching based on only the key word 
“Russia” yielded more than enough texts. However, the availability of English-language texts 
differs depending on the category (i.e., press release, speech, interview, etc.). The Chancellor’s 
office provides a number of different types of documents. As with other entities, it posts 
transcripts of the Chancellor’s speeches and press releases as well as its own summaries of the 
Chancellor’s activities in two forms. First, the Chancellor’s staff publishes ‘articles,’ which are 
self-created reports of important meetings or events. In addition, they release travel reports, 
which describe trips to foreign countries or engagements with leaders of other states. Both of 
these types of documents include direct quotes from the Chancellor, not merely summaries or 
reports of activity. Most documents, with the exception of travel reports, appear sparsely prior to 
2010 but beginning in that year, most types of texts were available in English. But for one 
speech, all texts prior to 2010 fell into the category of travel report. In addition, none of the texts 
on this site preceded Chancellor Angela Merkel, who was elected in 2005; therefore no data from 
Chancellor Schroeder was available on a government site. However, Gerhard Schroeder 
maintains his own website  on which he provides translated versions of speeches and statements 11
from his time in office. While the number is small, it provided a limited number of substantive 





Similarly, the Federal Foreign Office publishes translated versions of various texts but as 
above, these do not extend back through the entire period covered in this study. Unlike the 
Chancellor’s office, the Foreign Office produced press releases, offering translated versions 
beginning in 2008. Starting in 2010, transcripts of interviews become available in English, not 
only from the Foreign Minister but other government officials as well. From 2012 English 
translations of speeches are available and finally in 2014 the Foreign Office similarly published 
translations of media articles concerning officials from the ministry. 
As is evident, the texts available from government archives do not provide sufficient data 
for the entire range of this study. In order to obtain more foreign policy texts from German policy 
makers, I turned to newspaper articles. The search began with stories published in 2003 and 
continued through 2009 when a sufficient number of German government documents became 
available. Beginning with the LexisNexis database, I looked for articles containing references to 
Russia and either the Chancellor (Schroeder through 2005, Merkel beginning in late 2005) or the 
Foreign Minister (Fischer through late 2005, followed by Steinmeier). This initial search yielded 
over 1500 documents for 2003 alone, which led me to add additional constraints. Initially, I 
limited my search to prominent American newspapers: The New York Times and The Washington 
Post, which returned a manageable number of documents. However, another source emerged that 
provided more varied perspectives: the World News Connection  database, which publishes 12
international media reports translated by the US government. These articles came from a wide 
variety of countries, especially, Germany, Russia, China, France and other European countries. 
For data on German policy makers’ speech regarding Russia covering the years 2004 to 2008 I 
 https://www.eastview.com/Files/EVWorldNewsConnection.pdf12
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relied almost exclusively on texts found in this database. Regardless of the source, I included 
only articles with actual quotes, rather than a journalist’s summary or paraphrase.  
The final list of sources is contained below in Table 6.  As it shows, the sources of texts 
changed significantly over time.  In the early years of the study I included few government texts, 
only a few speeches and articles, and rather relied on media reports instead.  Eventually, as 
government-furnished data became more readily accessible, I relied solely on them, transitioning 
from those that remained in the ‘politics from above category’ (Fetzer, 2013) to those that 
reflected ‘mediated politics.” 
After coding the data, a total of 688 quotations emerged from the texts. As expected given the 
sources, the speakers consisted principally of the Chancellor (38%) and the Foreign Minister 
(50%). The rest of the references come from a variety of government officials with contributions 
from a German Minister of State (5%) and the Chancellor’s Office (3%) providing noticeably 
frequent discourse. 
The documents fit into several categories of talk as described by Fetzer (2013): the 
speeches and articles represent discourse from the ‘top-down’ while the interviews offer 
Table	6		—	Types	of	German	texts
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Newspaper 
Article
17 26 8 30 37 34 19 0 0 0 0 0
Speech 1 1 1 5 2 1 5 10 8 7 8 0
Interview 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 12 3 28 20 36
Gov Release 0 0 1 5 7 9 3 6 5 5 0 0
Total 18 27 11 44 46 44 28 28 16 40 28 36
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‘mediated discourse.’ The former represent a politician’s viewpoint on a particular situation or 
the stance taken by the government. Alternatively, the latter demonstrate the idea of ‘doing 
politics in the media’ and allow for interaction between the policy maker (or his representative) 
and the journalist which facilitates greater clarification at the time or more deliberate speech 
since the speaker is aware that her points may be contested. When possible, I opt for interview 
transcripts given the two-way nature of the discourse. However, for this case study I relied on 
texts of both types due to the availability of sources of data in English. The sources of data for 
the conflict years, which form the heart of my research, differ but nonetheless provide sufficient 
data to analyze the discourse. 
What did they talk about? Issues in German-Russian discourse 
Germany interacted with Russia in multiple contexts through the years considered in this study. 
As one of the key actors in the European Union and a global economic power, Germany had 
frequent occasions to relate to Russia on key worldwide and regional concerns, including 
economic and security issues, in multilateral fora. At the same time, these two countries 
frequently engaged in purely bilateral contexts. Figure 11 shows the frequency of references to 
different issues by year as a percentage of the total references coded in the discourse analysis for 
the respective year. Considering the percentage of the discourse allows a comparison both within 
and across years.  
Bilateral topics consisted of areas of joint concern including economic, cultural, technical 
cooperation. These concerns were most prominent in 50% of the years under investigation and 
were either the first- or second-most referenced topic during all years but 2007. Over time, a 
number of international events brought the two countries together, although they did not occupy 
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an enduring place over time. As shown in Figure 11, Germany and Russia shared involvement in 
Iran’s nuclear program, Iraq’s WMD, the Middle East Peace Process, and Syria. Regional issues 
such as Georgia, Ukraine and more general discussions of European security also found a 
significant place in Russo-German rhetoric. Finally, given Germany’s prominent leadership role 
in the European Union and influence in NATO, a robust amount of discourse exists between the 
two countries related to the relationships between these international organizations and Russia. 
Given the starting point of this study (2003), the first issue that emerges is the 
international effort to respond to the Iraqi WMD program. This issue formed the foundation for 
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the majority (52%) of German discourse during 2003. However, once the US-led coalition began 
the war in Iraq, it disappeared from the rhetoric. In its wake, bilateral issues dominated German 
foreign policy rhetoric in the years 2004 and 2005, comprising 42% and 70% respectively, which 
began a pattern of consistent bilateral focus that was only interrupted by significant, 
multinational events. In 2004, there was a brief spike related to Ukraine in response to disputed 
elections there, the resolution of which both Germany and Russia involved themselves. As with 
the previous crisis, once it was resolved the issue retreated from the dialogue. Discussions related 
to democracy likewise appeared frequently in this year, constituting a greater percentage of the 
discourse than in any subsequent year. 
Possibly as a result of elections in Germany, the level of Russo-German rhetoric declined 
significantly in general in 2005. Subjects of German policy makers’ discourse consisted of over 
70% bilateral issues while multilateral or multinational events formed a negligible part of what 
little was said that year. Rhetoric related to energy and democracy represented about 10% each, 
which, due to the limited number of texts, consists of only two or three references throughout the 
entire year.  
Subsequent years saw multinational, regional, and global issues emerge again. While 
bilateral discussions remained most prominent in 2006 at 25%, discourse surrounding energy 
(23%) and Iran’s nuclear program (20%) drew almost equal attention. The former is not 
surprising given the crisis that emerged with regard to Ukrainian delivery of Russian gas to 
central and Western Europe. Eclipsing purely bilateral concerns, energy discussions rose to 
prominence in 2007, appearing only slightly more frequently than dialogue concerning the EU-
Russia relationship. The multilateral turn that year is most likely a result of the fact that 
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Chancellor Merkel held the rotating Presidency of the European Council for half of 2007. 
Furthermore, German policy makers devoted significant attention to the MEPP and regional 
security concerns while the Iranian nuclear issue receded slightly in salience.  
The pattern of international issues flaring up for a year and then receding into silence is 
demonstrated most robustly in 2008 with the appearance of the Russo-Georgian war. Despite 
lasting less than a month—up to three if you include all of the rhetoric that followed—the war 
constituted a disproportionate 55% of the discourse, although this is not surprising given the 
widespread concern it elicited from European countries. Nevertheless, as quickly as it had 
appeared in the rhetoric, it likewise vanished almost entirely by 2009. When not focused on 
Georgia, German-Russian dialogue overwhelmingly centered once again around bilateral issues, 
which were reflected in 20% of the statements. By 2009 this subject returned to predominance at 
32% of the discourse. Similarly, after declining in salience the previous year, regional security 
concerns regained attention in 2009, constituting almost 18% of the discourse while Iran’s 
nuclear program and energy considerations appeared in almost 12%.  
Subsequent years saw great volatility in the issues comprising German-Russian 
discourse. Bilateral topics continued to appear frequently in 2010 (23%) and 2011 (17%) but 
other considerations either matched or superseded that focus in salience. Regional security 
concerns found equal attention as a strictly bilateral focus in 2010 while the following year 
rhetoric surrounding NATO-Russia relations became gained prominence at 26% of the dialogue. 
Similarly, the discourse during these years demonstrated one additional consistency in that the 
Iranian nuclear issue remained a noticeable topic of discussion. 
!95
The next two years revealed a similar pattern. In 2012, bilateral issues returned to the top 
of the list (37%) but emerged as only slightly more salient than the civil war in Syria (33%) 
while other concerns faded dramatically. Discussions about Iran’s nuclear program remained a 
notable undercurrent while dialogue regarding Russian democracy reemerged as significant, 
reflecting the fact that 2012 was an election year in Russia. The crisis in Syria became the most 
salient topic in 2013 (36%) with purely bilateral dialogue declining but maintaining a frequent 
presence at 25% of the discourse. A number of other considerations rose slightly in frequency at 
the expense of bilateral rhetoric: EU-Russian relations, concerns about human rights, and the 
debate over a European-based missile defense system made noticeable appearances at over 9%. 
Subsequently, each of these issues was drowned out the following year as a result of 
Russian activity in various parts of Ukraine. Discourse on this topic unsurprisingly formed 
almost two-thirds of German policy makers’ utterances related to Russia. Dramatically reduced 
from previous years, bilateral dialogue was the second most salient issue in 2014. Other issues 
faded significantly from the dialogue and constituted a small portion of the discussion.  
As described above, a certain issues continued to appear at varying levels of salience 
across the breadth of the time period under consideration. Above all, the discourse focused on 
bilateral issues. Beyond that, a mixture of regional considerations and international crises 
predominated. Over the twelve-year period considered, Ukraine appeared in more rhetoric than 
other runners-up. Energy concerns, while only rising to the top of the list in 2006-07, appeared 
next most frequently. Syria and EU-Russia relations were close behind in salience followed by 
the conflict in Georgia. Other topics such as MEPP, NATO-Russia relations, and democracy 
found their way into the dialogue at a regular, albeit minimal, frequencies.  
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These issues provide the background for considering the various themes that emerge 
across time.  Independently, they do not provide independent insight into the motivations behind 
foreign policy decisions, but as a basis for foreign policy decisions, they help to understand why 
particular themes increase or decrease at certain times. For instance, rhetoric emphasizing 
multilateralism must be based on an issue requiring responses from the international community 
such as concern over the Iraq weapons of Mass destruction (WMD) program. Considering the 
themes in light of the international context of the time offers a fuller understanding of the 
discourse. 
In their own words - German foreign policy motivations 
Throughout the range of the time under consideration, evidence of almost every set of themes is 
evident to a greater or lesser extent. The exception to this is the lack of references concerned 
with the nature of the international system which would be consistent with the structural realist 
approach. References to polarity of any kind, whether bi-, uni-, or multi-polarity appear only 
twice as do discussions of power or capabilities. Figure 12 shows the percentage of the discourse 
represented by themes associated with each of the theoretically possible explanations.  At the 
same time, neoclassical realist themes frequently appear in the rhetoric of German politicians. 
While German policy makers would have been interested in systemic dynamics, their discourse, 
summarized in figure 13, reveals a number of influences that would mitigate against predicted 
balancing behaviors in response to increasing Russian power and influence.  
Directly tied to the overarching concern mentioned above of energy in German-Russian 
relations, energy security formed a prominent theme in the interstate discourse. There were some 
discussions related to this theme in the early years but it became highly salient in 2006-7, which 
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matches the progress of issues over time as seen above. Following German-Russian 
intergovernmental dialogues in 2006, Chancellor Merkel remarked, “It is in our interests to 
preserve and expand contacts in energy.” (ITAR-TASS, 2006) During EU Council meetings later 
that year, she reinforced the perspective, saying “What we must make clear is that we offer 
security for (energy) contracts and we expect the same from Russia," in matters of contract 
security and market access” (Harrington, 2006). More directly, Merkel admitted in an interview 
with a Greek journalist in 2007, “Europe needs security in the domain of energy resources. It 
needs the reliability of its suppliers the same way Russia needs our reliability as a 
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Figure 12 — Theoretical perspectives in German discourse over time 
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client.” (Papakonstandinou, 2007) After sharing its leading role within the neoclassical realist 
group in 2008, energy security declined in salience and eventually faded almost entirely. 
Reflecting a reorientation of focus, rhetoric regarding the Russian contribution to regional 
security spiked in the years 2009-2011. This relates to the belief that cooperation with Russia is 
necessary to preserve European or regional security, regardless of how the balance of power may 
shift. At the 2010 Munich Security Conference, Foreign Minister Westerwelle asserted in his 
speech that “[t]he strategic partnership with Russia is not only one of the keys to European 
security but also vital for resolving global problems.” (2010a) Later that year in advance of the 
NATO summit in Lisbon, he commented “What we hope to do in Lisbon is lay the basis for a 














Figure 13 — Realist themes in German discourse over time (% total annual discourse)
benefit.”  (Westerwelle, 2010d) While diminished in the discourse in 2012-13, security concerns 
reemerged in 2014 at the top of realist-related themes. Steinmeier again highlighted the critical 
role that Russia plays in the region:  
There is, however, one certain and undeniable fact which applies to the foreseeable 
future: we will continue to be reliant on cooperation with Russia. This cooperation serves 
our own security and is thus in Germany’s best interest, as well as that of the EU and the 
United States. A European security architecture geared to the long term is inconceivable 
without Russia. (2014a) 
While not dominant in the early years under consideration, rhetoric describing Russia as a 
partner, particularly a “strategic partner,” constituted a noticeable part of the German foreign 
policy statements. Emphasis on the need for a strategic partnership, energy security, and 
prioritization of regional security issues demonstrate delayed reactions to systemic imperatives 
or their deviation from expected responses to increased Russia capabilities and assertiveness as 
seen in their intervention in Georgia or their military modernization described above. Rather than 
taking actions to balance against Russia, which would be expected from a purely neorealist 
perspective, German policy makers preferred to focus on developing close relationships with 
Russia, particularly in security affairs. Moreover, Russia stood to gain relatively more from 
Germany than the other way around which goes against the neorealist assertions that states will 
seek relative versus absolute gains. The consistent discourse about the need for strategic 
partnerships demonstrates the restraining effect of other (domestic) forces, such as a lack of 
consensus among leaders about the threat posed by Russia or the desire of domestic actors to 
prioritize other security concerns 
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Early texts reveal regular references to German-Russian partnership but became more 
salient beginning in 2008.  In remarks ahead of a visit to the newly elected President Dmitry 
Medvedev, Chancellor Merkel stated “Germany and Russia are bound by close, friendly and 
strategic relations. We can develop and boost them. I think it is both possible and 
necessary” (ITAR-TASS, 2008a). Moreover, Foreign Minister Steinmeier commented in a speech 
to German ambassadors, “We are now in a world where everyone ... needs partners more than 
they need opponents. That goes for all actors on the international stage, I think, for Russia and 
the United States included," Steinmeier said (2008). The timing of the latter is particularly 
noteworthy in that the address occurred September 8, 2008 barely over a month after the Russo-
Georgian War. His successor, Guido Westerwelle, returned to this theme at the Munich Security 
Conference in 2010, declaring “The strategic partnership with Russia is not only one of the keys 
to European security but also vital for resolving global problems.” (2010a) and continued to 
highlight this perspective in following years, despite other disagreements such as the arrest and 
trial of the punk band Pussy Riot as discussed below. Westerwelle described in an interview in 
2012, “We want a strategic partnership with Russia, not just on energy and security issues, but 
also with respect to the rule of law” (2012b).  
As the above examples demonstrate, rhetoric reflecting neoclassical realist themes related 
to energy, regional security, shared interests and bilateral partnerships formed a significant part 
of German policy makers’ discourse over time, with noticeable peaks in 2006 as a result of the 
gas crisis in Ukraine, and 2010 based on concerns about regional security. At the same time, 
significant evidence exists to support the idea of a German “multilateral reflex,” i.e., an 
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immediate turn toward institutional solutions for multinational problems. Figure 14 demonstrates 
the appearance of these themes over time.  
Multilateral cooperation between Germany and Russia initially appears in conjunction 
with noticeable international crises. The first is obviously in 2003 in response to the US-led war 
in Iraq. Germany, along with France and Russia, led the opposition to the use of force as a means 
to resolve the uncertainty of Saddam Hussein’s defiance of international efforts to end Iraq’s 
WMD program. During the discussions at the United Nations, France, Germany, and Russia 
asserted in a joint statement that "The use of force can only be a last resort." (Agence France-
Presse, 2003) Put slightly differently, these states’ foreign ministers soon followed with another 
release which stated, “Our common objective remains the full and effective disarmament of Iraq, 
in compliance with Resolution 1441.” (New York Times, 2003) 
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Figure 14 — Institutional themes in German discourse over time  













Another spike in multilateral rhetoric appeared in 2006 driven by cooperation on the 
issues of the Iranian nuclear weapons program and the MEPP. On a visit to Russia, Chancellor 
Merkel commented, “On the question of the Iranian nuclear program Merkel and Putin agreed to 
continue to work with other European governments and the US administration in an effort to find 
a solution.” (Office of the Chancellor, 2006a) Later that year following a tripartite meeting with 
Presidents Chirac and Putin, she again noted their solidarity concerning the Middle East Peace 
Process: “All three countries agreed that a two-state solution must be found in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and that President Abbas must be given political support.” (Chancellor, 
2006b)  
After fading in importance for a few years, this discourse reemerged in 2010 as the 
international community attempted to find a resolution to the raging civil war in Syria, peaking 
again in 2011. In contrast to early German rhetoric showing no indication of tensions between 
the two countries or differences of opinions with regard to multinational solutions, discussions 
over time became noticeably critical of the lack of Russian willingness to cooperate with the 
international community as the Syrian crisis drug on, particularly in 2012 and 2013. In response 
to a question connecting Iran with the crisis in Syria, Foreign Minister Westerwelle commented, 
“It’s obvious of course that Iran meddles in Syria’s affairs more than any of us would wish. It’s 
most regrettable, too, that with its veto in the Security Council Russia has placed itself on the 
wrong side of history.” (2012a) 
As the civil war continued with no resolution in sight, he was later asked a more pointed 
question regarding his disappointment with Russia’s stance on the civil war in Syria, to which he 
responded, “Of course I am disappointed with Russia’s stance. Even with a view to Russia’s 
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national interests, this is not a convincing position.” (Westerwelle, 2013b) While events in Syria 
continued, Russian actions in Ukraine shifted much of the focus of German rhetoric there, 
reducing the attention to multilateralism. 
Beyond these multilateral perspectives and closer to home, the European Union offers a 
significant institutional venue for German-Russian relations: the European Union. Once the 
reserved domain of states, foreign policy has become a significant aspect of the European Union 
as well. Rhetoric related to the EU-Russian relationship showed particular salience in 2007 and 
2010, at which points European countries sought to solidify the partnership. The dialogue from 
an interview with Chancellor Merkel in 2007 shows the German perspective favoring a 
multilateral approach to relations: 
“[Sueddeutsche Zeitung] Is there actually any uniform European perception of Russia? 
East European states in particular do have a different interpretation of Russia's attitudes 
to that of Germany. 
[Merkel] What is important is that the European Union should come across as a 
community in its encounters with Russia. Europe will only succeed through 
commonality.” (Kornelius and Winter, 2007) 
Following a brief downturn in EU-Russian relations and stalled discussions regarding a 
partnership following the Russo-Georgian war, the multinational focus returned. Following 
German-Russian intergovernmental talks, the Chancellor’s office noted, “[t]he Chancellor 
described Russia’s accession to the WTO as ‘desirable’. The next step in closer relations with 
Russia will, however, be the new Partnership Agreement between the EU and 
Russia” (Chancellor, 2010). Later that year, Minister of State Hoyer expressed the idea more 
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clearly, “The European Union needs Russia just as Russia needs the European Union. This holds 
true not only in the business sphere and regarding energy security, but also in the sphere of 
security policy” (2010). 
Shifting away from the role of institutions and exogenously defined interests to that of 
preferences reveals regular German concern with domestic priorities as described by the liberal 
perspective. As shown in figure 15, discourse reflecting a bilateral relationship based on various 
forms of interconnectedness and/or referring to interstate economic ties maintained a regular 
presence, generally undeterred by international events. In contrast to rhetoric related to other 
liberal themes that maintained a relatively consistent presence over time, discussions concerning 
modernization clearly became more significant during the later years in this study.  
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 Interdependence and economic concerns showed a high degree of salience in both 2004 
and 2005. Following German-Russian consultations in 2004, Chancellor Schroeder summarized 
the events, “Yesterday [21 December], seven documents were signed…following the conclusion 
of the seventh Russian-German interstate consultations. ‘Our relations have reached an 
unprecedented depth and breadth.’” (Vorobyev and Petrov, 2004), indicating an ever-increasing 
sense of connections across multiple domains . Soon after, he reiterated his assessment of the 13
relationship, “Since the sea change of 1989/90, we have managed to remodel our relations with 
Russia and moved away from Cold War confrontation towards ever more comprehensive 
cooperation – in political, security and economic terms.” (Schroeder, 2005) Subsequent years 
saw a relative decline in this rhetoric although it remained one of the three most frequent themes 
until 2014. The texts reveal a spike in these discussions again in 2010 which was a year of 
heightened interstate dialogue in general. Foreign Minister Westerwelle returns to the discourse 
seen above: “Today our relations rest on a solid and broad foundation: our economic ties have 
acquired an intensity unknown in earlier times.” (Westerwelle, 2010b) That year revealed a two-
fold increase in references to the Russo-German economic relationship. Every year after that, 
however, saw a decrease in discourse about economics. Discussions of interdependence rose and 
fell moderately over the course of time under consideration but emerged significantly in 2011 
before declining again to typical levels.  
As seen already in the realist discussions, German policy makers frequently referred to 
their relationship with Russia as a partnership, often as a ‘strategic’ one. While sometimes 
exclusively a security-related reference, this idea also appears in the context of bilateral 
 The documents to which he is referring outlined cooperation in the areas of human rights, cultural and 13
political exchange.
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economic relations, similar to the discourse discussed above, only slightly more explicit in this 
case. This rhetoric constitutes the dominant liberal theme between 2006 and 2008. Soon after the 
new coalition government took office in 2005, Foreign Minister Steinmeier noted in an an 
interview “the remarkable political and economic transformation process Russia has undergone 
over the past 15 years. Russia has become a reliable, indispensable international 
partner” (2006a).  Following a quiet year, partnership references reemerged in 2010 as the 
second most frequent topic reflecting liberal perspectives and again in 2012-13 as the 
predominant one.  During increased tensions between the two countries as a result of German 
concerns over political freedoms on Russia, policy makers remained committed however to 
adhering to the notion of a strategic economic partnership, as Prime Minister Westerwelle 
asserted, “Europe, Germany and Russia are committed in partnership. Never before have our 
economies and societies been so closely intertwined” (2012c). 
Finally, a liberal theme focused on Russian modernization, relating to both economics 
and politics, first appeared briefly in 2006 and again in 2008 but after each of these instances fell 
away. Early in her first term as chancellor, Merkel remarked, “The Russian economy is going 
through a period of very steady modernization, and we have an interest in this process 
continuing," she noted” (ITAR-TASS, 2006).  Keeping with the pattern observed above, this 
subject reemerged in 2010 to a great extent and was even more prominent in 2012 before 
dropping again to a more moderate level. At the time, Foreign Minister Westerwelle commented, 
“We want to support [Russian] efforts to modernize, thus creating a common area of prosperity, 
rule of law, security and freedom.” (2010c) Once more in 2012 he echoed the same sentiment, 
“They [Russia] are part of a partnership geared to the modernization of the economy, society and 
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the judiciary, which has become even more necessary in the face of globalization.” (Westerwelle, 
2012c)  
Examining the texts from a constructivist perspective reveals a distinctly different 
pattern, as shown in Figure 16. For the majority of years considered, language emblematic of 
constructivist themes was almost completely absent yet nevertheless at times it dominated the 
discourse. First, as discovered with statements associated with the structural realist themes, the 
texts reveal an almost complete lack of references to identity, with only one reference in 2003 
and another in 2014. Dialogue based on international norms, however, reveals distinct patterns. 
With the exception of human rights, norms-based rhetoric referring to topics such as 
international law and appropriate state behaviors appears almost exclusively during the conflict 
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period of 2008 and 2014 at which times references to all associated themes explode. Discussions 
relating to international law and peaceful conflict resolution appear exclusively in those two 
years while references to appropriate state behavior, sovereignty, and territorial integrity make 
single, infrequent appearances over time. 
 In response to the Russo-Georgian war, German policy makers exhibited a strong focus 
on peaceful resolution to the conflict. Both the chancellor and her foreign minister rapidly 
responded to the Russian intervention as their offices reported: "The chancellor expressed once 
again her great concern about the further escalation of the situation in Georgia and the dramatic 
consequences for the suffering civilian population.” Similarly, the German Foreign Office noted 
that “Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier spoke with his Russian and Georgian 
counterparts and also called for an ‘immediate end to the hostilities’” (AFP, 2008a). Commenting 
on the need for a long term solution, Merkel again mentioned, “The aim now must be to find a 
political solution to the fifteen-year-old conflict, and not to indulge in mutual recriminations. The 
problem must no longer be shelved, or open conflict is likely to erupt.” (Chancellor, 2008a) 
These statements from German policy makers reveal their preference to avoiding violent means 
of conflict resolution and reaching mutually acceptable solutions through negotiated political 
settlement instead. 
At the same time, much of the reaction of German policy makers made reference to 
international law. Upon hearing of the Russian parliament’s moves toward recognizing the 
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Merkel “said she was ‘deeply concerned’ about the 
Russian parliament’s vote on independence for and acceptance of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
‘It contravenes international law’, she said” (Chancellor, 2008b). Foreign minister Steinmeier 
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cast the Russian annexation of Crimea in an identical light in 2014. In discussing German moves 
toward sanctions, he noted, “We have responded emphatically to Russia’s action, which violates 
international law” (Steinmeier, 2014c). 
German rhetoric also found a footing in international expectations of state behavior in 
both crisis situations. In 2008, with regard to expectations for Russian compliance with the Six-
Point Plan, the chancellor’s spokesman noted,  
“she ‘believes that when one signs an agreement . . . then one should then stick to the 
obligations that they have made.’ So it is clear that in the course of today (Monday) and 
the coming days the Russians should withdraw their troops from Georgia” (AFP, 2008b)    
She subsequently expressed her disapproval of Russian actions in Georgia, “calling Russia's 
response to actions by Georgia in South Ossetia "disproportionate” (ITAR-TASS, 2008b). 
When conflict emerged again in 2014, German policy makers resurrected this language 
pertaining to appropriate state behavior. Following the crash of Malaysia Air flight MH17, 
Foreign Minister Steinmeier remarked, noting the need for a ‘reasonable’ policy,  
Those who are responsible for hundreds of people dying in a plane which was in all 
likelihood shot down must be brought to justice. We take an equally serious tone when 
discussing how to overcome the current crisis and how to bring Russia round to a 
reasonable policy, one that takes responsibility for peace in Europe. (2014d) 
The sum of this discourse reveals the German perspective on appropriate behavior of a 
modern state of great power stature. Specifically, rather than violence, great powers should 
pursue policies that promote peace and stability. In addition, states ought to follow through on 
their commitments such as those pledged in cease-fire agreements. Finally, when resorting to 
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violence, powerful states must not employ their power excessively. The rhetoric points to the 
need to make decisions based on logics of appropriateness rather than consequences. German 
speakers here are not critiquing Russian actions based on their impacts on Germany but rather 
their coherence with the expectations of powerful states. 
Furthermore, similar to Merkel’s call for the implementation of the cease-fire in Georgia, 
Steinmeier notes the necessity of complying with an international agreement in 2014 with regard 
to elections in eastern Ukraine: 
“There is a very great danger that holding these [Ukrainian] elections will result in 
renewed tensions. It is clear to us that the elections are a clear violation of the Minsk 
ceasefire agreements, which is why we will not recognize them. Russia must live up to its 
great responsibility in this most important issue” (2014e).”  
In addition, German policy makers made frequent reference to the international norm of 
respecting a state’s territorial integrity. Once again responding to the decision by the Duma to 
recognize the breakaway republics, Merkel "urge[d] Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev not to 
sign the resolution" because it “would violate Georgia’s territorial integrity" (Chancellor, 2008b). 
While Germany reestablished routine bilateral relations with Russia soon after the war, Merkel 
held the line with regard to Georgia, reiterating that "Georgia's territorial integrity is not 
negotiable” (Chancellor, 2008c). Six years later, Foreign Minister Steinmeier would echoed the 
same sentiment, this time with respect to Ukraine, asserting that the annexation of Crimea 
“violate[s] the central foundations of the European framework for peace” because Russia is 
“attempt[ing] to redraw internationally recognized borders in our European 
neighborhood” (2014b). 
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Unlike the normative concerns referenced above, discourse on human rights makes 
regular, noticeable appearances. The presence of this rhetoric is frequently based on internal 
Russian events such as the handling of journalists and opposition politicians as well as internal 
unrest such as during the fighting in Chechnya. German policy makers consistently highlighted 
their promotion of human rights in their dealings with their Russian counterparts. During the 
2004 violence in Chechnya, Foreign Minister Fischer emphasized, “We have always insisted on 
human rights observance in Chechnya, the condemnation of those who violate them, and the 
need for a peaceful solution within the Russian Federation to the benefit of the Chechen 
majority” (Fischer, 2003). His successor likewise defended his dealings with Russia against 
charges of ignoring Russian violations of human rights, as he avowed “on my visits to Russia, 
human rights issues, especially the treatment of non-governmental organizations, were always a 
topic I discussed there” (Steinmeier, 2006b). In 2012, spurred on by the trial of punk rock group 
Pussy Riot, Germans paid significant attention to state of human rights in Russia. In an interview, 
the Federal Government Commissioner for Human Rights Policy described the German 
approach: 
Well, we urge our Russian partners again and again to comply with Council of Europe 
standards. Russia is a member of the Council of Europe, it has signed the European 
Convention on Human Rights and is thus obligated to meet these standards. And it’s up to 
the other members of the Council of Europe to go on reminding the Russians that they 
have to comply with the standards to which they voluntarily committed themselves. 
(Löning, 2012) 
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The following year, Foreign Minister Westerwelle bluntly offered his opinion, asserting “The 
recent events and the way that civil society is treated in Russia are depressing” (Westerwelle, 
2013b). 
This concern was not limited to internal Russian dynamics, however. It also emerged in 
the discourse related to events in Georgia. Resisting calls to assign blame for the conflict in its 
immediate aftermath, Merkel commented, "now is not the time to analyze the genesis of the 
conflict - the sides are doing that. What matters most at the moment is to stop the firing and 
ensure security for the civilians” (Interfax, 2008)  
Finally, I consider the presence of rhetoric related to the state of democracy in Russia 
because of its tie to democratic peace theory. Compared to other themes, democracy makes 
relatively infrequent appearances in the discourse, although a general pattern does emerge, as 
shown in Figure 17. 
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Similar to evaluations of multilateral discourse, rhetoric associated with democracy can 
be either positive or negative. In the early years of this study, German policy makers referred to 
Russian democracy exclusively in a positive light. In 2004, Chancellor Schroeder remarked, “I 
regard Vladimir Putin as a man who wants to restructure Russia to become a real democratic 
society, counting on a very close relationship with the West” (Schroeder, 2004) The following 
year he reinforced his claim, asserting “The fact that Russia, as a country with no real democratic 
traditions of its own, decided of its own accord to follow a democratic path, cannot but inspire 
respect among us” (Krumrey, Poertner, and Weigold, 2005) 
The rhetoric in 2006 revealed the greatest references to democracy of any year covered in 
this study and included discourse in support and critical of Russia’s domestic politics. In 2007 
the affirmative references disappeared entirely whereas the negative increased. Prior to the 
elections of 2007, subsequent to German-Russian intergovernmental consultations, one German 
official demurred that “The German side "has no intention to interfere in internal affairs or 
political contests in Russia. However, ‘we as democracy, as deputies’ support political 
competition and development upon a free basis” Moreover, he offered a very pointed 
characterization of interstate relations, avowing “This [free, open democracy] is a basis for the 
success of further political cooperation between Russia and Germany, including at a 
parliamentary level” (Interfax, 2007). Later that year, again prior to the elections, Foreign 
Minister Steinmeier frankly expressed his assessment of Russian politics, asserting that “Russia 
is not a model democracy.” (Best, von Hammerstein, Neukirch, and Schep, 2007). Following 
Russian elections that year, “a government spokesman in Berlin said Germany did not believe 
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the landslide victory of Putin's ruling United Russia party had been achieved by free or fair 
means” (AFP, 2007). 
Subsequent years saw singular expressions of support for democracy in 2008 and 2010 
before disappearing from the dialogue altogether while discussions noting concern remained in 
the discourse, except for 2009 when no German speakers referred to Russian democracy at all. 
The negative aspect of the theme emerged most prominently in 2012, an election year. Reacting 
to OSCE reports on the conduct of Russian elections, Westerwelle suggested that “these 
assessments show that Russia “still has a long way to go on the road to rule of law and 
democracy” (Federal Foreign Office, 2012). 
In general, pertaining to the issue of democracy, mixed (positive and negative) discourse 
appears in the first half of the study while only critical comments emerge in the latter half. More 
significantly, the greatest spikes in negative rhetoric about Russian democracy come in the 
election years of 2007 and 2012. 
Preeminent discourses — tracing the most salient German rhetoric over time 
The examination of the salience of each set of themes by year can provide additional 
insights into the motivations for German foreign policy, including in the years of 2008 and 2014.  
As might be expected, themes appear salient in German discourse in any given year correspond 
to the bi-lateral and multi-lateral issues dominating German foreign relations and discussed in 
the first section of this chapter.  Figure 18 provides a graphic view of the relationship between 
theoretical categories over time. 
 During the first year considered, 2003, the discourse reveals both areas of cooperation as 
well as opposition between Germany and Russia. The most salient discourse reflected an 
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institutionalist focus on multilateral solutions to international problems as a result of the ongoing 
quest to resolve the crisis in Iraq. At the same time, German attention to the Russian crackdown 
in Chechnya led to increased rhetoric related to human rights issues. Despite additional concerns 
about the state of democracy in Russia, German rhetoric did not demonstrate confrontation but 
support on the basis of shared opposition to US unilateral with respect to Iraq.  
The rhetoric of the following year demonstrated similar priorities. Although not as 
dominant, the institutional perspective maintained its prominence in the discourse, which is 
surprising in light of the overwhelming priority of bilateral discussions in 2004. However, a wide 
variety of other topics, primarily international attention to events in Ukraine as well as an 
!116













increase in attention to the MEPP, led to multilateral concerns remaining at the forefront. At the 
same time, the discussions also revealed significant cooperation associated with liberal and 
neoclassical realist expectations. As a result of a greater number of bilateral interactions, 
economics and interdependence emerged as substantive issues. Equally prominent are 
discussions reinforcing concerns about energy security and areas of shared interest. Finally, this 
year saw a complete turnaround in the democracy discourse from opposition to even greater 
support.  
The following year saw a marked change in both issues and themes. With the US 
situation in Iraq out of the hands of most European countries and the resolution of the political 
crisis in Ukraine came a precipitous decline in issues requiring international attention and the 
concomitant rise in bilateral focus. As a result, rhetoric relating to institutional perspectives 
declined significantly in 2005. In its place, neoclassical realist themes became the most salient, 
significantly dominating other themes. The dominance of this approach reveals a focus on 
interests in the areas of energy and regional security and policy makers’ desire for cooperation 
with Russia in these areas, which would be contrary to a strict structural explanation because of 
the increased influence and relative power of Russia in the system. Similarly, evidence for 
interstate relations based on liberal concerns remains salient. Despite a small relative decline 
from the previous year, discourse related to liberal themes was the next most frequent with 
rhetoric about democracy emerging as another notable set of themes, replacing multilateralism. 
All three of these perspectives reflect the significant impact of domestic forces on the conduct of 
German foreign policy and offer support for either liberal or neoclassical realist explanations.  
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The rhetoric of 2006 supports explanations of cooperation based on institutional 
concerns, energy security interest, and liberal priorities, although that year brought about another 
re-ordering in the prominence of themes. The importance of multilateralism returned as the 
preeminent focus of German-Russian relations as a result of increased cooperation on the Iranian 
nuclear issue and the MEPP as well as an increase in dialogue about EU-Russian relations. As a 
result of the gas crisis in Ukraine, rhetoric reflecting neoclassical realist views also remained 
salient, led by a focus on energy security. Discourse reflecting both liberal and democracy 
concerns continued to decline although not dramatically. Furthermore, German discussions of 
Russian democracy remained overwhelmingly positive, reaching their highest point.  
These patterns of cooperation between Germany and Russia continued through 2007, 
despite changes in priority of issues. Discourse focused on institutional priorities became even 
more dominant than in 2006, despite the priority of energy as a topic. As a result of increased 
attention to EU-Russia relations and the MEPP as well as a continued concern with Iran’s nuclear 
program, German rhetoric was dominated by multilateral discussions. Alternatively, the 
discourse reflected a significant amount of attention related to neoclassical realist concerns, 
specifically energy and regional security. Once again, discussions reflecting liberal and 
democracy concerns declined in salience. Of note, however, is that perspectives on democracy in 
Russia once again shifted dramatically, once again becoming entirely unfavorable; this time due 
to their elections.  
The war between Russia and Georgia in 2008 dramatically altered the relative dominance 
of themes, although its occurrence later in the year allowed certain other discussions to emerge 
as well. Leading up to the conflict in August, German-Russian interactions manifested a similar 
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pattern as prior years, reflecting a significant amount of rhetoric related to institutionalist, 
neoclassical realist as well as liberal perspectives. Without the war in Georgia, the dominant 
dialogue would have continued to focus on multilateral concerns, led by continued EU-Russia 
dialogue. The levels of bilateral interaction increased from the previous year, resulting in 
continued presence of neoclassical realist and liberal-related discourse. The latter remained as 
prominent as in 2007, the only topic, other than constructivist ones, that did not decrease. 
However, the response to the Russo-Georgian war thrust constructivist themes to the fore, 
reflecting the entire range of constructivist considerations from international law, to territorial 
integrity, to human rights concerns. Despite a cease-fire negotiated by French President Sarkozy, 
serving as President of the EU at the time, German discourse did not demonstrate any concern or 
preference for a multilateral solution. 
Following an acceptable cease-fire plan, German rhetoric regarding Russia reflected 
more traditional priorities. In 2009, as prior issues such as bilateral relations and energy (as a 
result of another energy conflict between Russian and Ukraine) regained their prominence, so 
neoclassical rhetoric resumed its dominant position. Rhetoric reflecting concerns with the need 
(or desire) for Russian cooperation in the areas of energy security and regional security suggests 
that German policy makers sought to articulate why they were not opposing increases in Russian 
assertiveness. From another perspective, the liberal rhetoric increased in salience as a result of 
the return to a bilateral focus. 
The next year saw the same perspectives reflected in the rhetoric with a change in the 
order of the second and third most salient perspectives. Rhetoric revealing neoclassical realist 
considerations remained preeminent based on the strength of increased attention to regional 
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security which offset a dramatic decline in energy security discourse as a result of the EU’s 
energy security plan put in place following the previous year’s energy scare. Despite an overall 
decline in purely bilateral interaction, rhetoric reflecting liberal priorities increased in 
prominence on the strength of a dramatic increase in references to a German-Russian strategic 
partnership. Interest in multilateral institutional remained noticeable primarily based on NATO-
Russia discussions related to missile defense in Europe. 
These three sets of themes dominated the discourse in the following years as well, albeit 
in continually shifting prominence. In 2011, multilateralism returned to its predominant position 
among the dialogue. Thanks to continued focus on interactions with Russia via international 
organizations, namely the EU and NATO, coupled with continued concern with the Iranian 
nuclear issue and the MEPP, policy makers’ statements demonstrated a dominant concern for an 
institutional perspective. Invigorated efforts to create venues for cooperation demonstrate 
western nations’ desires to develop multilateral venues for coordination that could increase 
cooperation and prevent conflict with Russia in the future, lending support to an institutionalist 
explanation for German-Russian relations. Discourse reflecting a neoclassical realist perspective 
declined but remained prominent as German policy makers continued to emphasize Russia’s 
contributions to regional security. In contrast to previous years, liberal-related discussions 
declined, as attention to bilateral topics declined at the expense of NATO-Russia focus. 
While the most salient rhetoric remained the same in 2012, noticeable shifts occurred in 
the less salient perspectives. With the conflict in Syria gaining international attention, 
multilateral discourse sustained the primacy of the institutional approach, despite a dramatic 
reduction in attention to previously significant topics such as NATO-Russia cooperation. 
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Discussions reflecting liberal concerns rose dramatically from the previous year as German 
policy makers strongly emphasized their desires for Russian strategic partnership and hopes for 
Russian modernization. At the same time, language associated with neorealism declined steeply, 
continuing the trend begun in 2010. Just as energy security concerns dramatically declined so 
also had discussions promoting the positive role that Russia was playing or cold play in regional 
security. Discourse consistent with constructivist explanations emerged again. The increase in the 
salience of liberal themes is attributable to a noticeable increase in German discussions centered 
on Russia’s modernization and the two countries’ interdependence; constructivist rhetoric rose in 
prominence as a result of German concerns with domestic political issues in Russia, both of 
which came at the expense of neoclassical realist concerns regarding regional and energy 
security. Of note, since Russian elections took place in 2012, this year also contained an 
appreciable amount of dialogue concerning Russian democracy—all of it negative. After 
virtually disappearing as a topic since 2007 (another election year in which all statements 
expressed concern), Russian democracy once again emerged as a topic of discussion. 
The discourse from 2013 demonstrated consistent ranking of emphases from 2012 
although the relative frequencies and topics changed noticeably. By far, the institutionalist focus 
on multilateral interactions dominated the statements of German foreign policy makers, which is 
understandable given the overwhelming focus on the conflict in Syria. While disagreeing with 
Russian actions, Germany continued to highlight the need for a multilateral solution to the 
conflict that included Russia. At the same time, rhetoric promoting liberal ideas dropped 
noticeably as German policy makers spoke less about any of the themes reflecting a liberal basis 
for interaction. For the first time since 2008, rhetoric reflecting a constructivist approach made a 
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significant appearance in the discussions as well, this time focused on German concerns with 
human rights issues related to the conflict in Syria. 
Subsequently, Russian actions again led to dramatic shifts in German rhetoric toward 
Russia. The seizure of Crimea and support for the separatist movements in eastern Ukraine 
brought about a predictable reorientation of German dialogue similar to their reaction to the 
Russo-Georgian war in 2008. Once again, constructivist themes of all types, except human 
rights, dramatically increased in frequency while rhetoric reflecting the previously predominant 
perspectives dropped precipitously. For its part, human rights dialogue shifted from discussions 
pertaining to Syria to those concerned with Ukraine. 
Discussion — assessing the Germany findings 
To what extent do these findings reveal the motivations behind German foreign policy decisions? 
As discussed at the outset, various theoretical approaches offer potential explanations of the 
observed foreign policy decisions, i.e., first to abstain from sanctions in 2008 and then to support 
sanctions in 2014. In evaluating these hypotheses, it is necessary to compare the discourse across 
time in order to account for a change in behavior. In other words, were there changes in 
discourse that account for the change in motivations behind the foreign policy behavior? 
When considering the years in isolation, the texts demonstrate certain patterns of 
behavior clearly. Conflicts in which Russia was a party generated distinctly different responses 
than those to which it was an outside entity. For all years except the conflict years, 2008 and 
2014, rhetoric reflecting constructivist a perspective is essentially absent from German foreign 
policy discussions. However, in the time periods including Russian interventions, the discourse 
overwhelmingly manifests discourse suggestive of a constructivist approach to German foreign 
!122
policy based on normative concerns such as human rights, international law, and maintaining 
territorial and sovereignty of states rather than rhetoric related to multilateralism or neoclassical 
realist perspectives. At the same time, conflicts or issues geographically removed from Europe 
and to which both Russia and European countries were third parties or jointly in opposition such 
as the Iranian nuclear weapons program, the Middle East Peace Process, and the civil war in 
Syria, overwhelmingly elicited rhetoric reflecting an institutional perspective.  
If the dominant discourse cannot account for changes in 
the observed behaviors, it is necessary to consider other 
factors that may have varied over time, including patterns 
of interaction that may not be apparent when merely 
considering the two years of conflict. Table 7 summarizes 
the change in emphasis of theoretical perspectives 
between 2008 and 2014. 
The data fail to support structural realist motivations for 
German interactions with Russia. German rhetoric is essentially void of any mention of polarity 
and power; there is no mention of interest in multipolarity or concern of American unipolarity. 
Neither do the statements reflect any concern with changes in Russian capabilities. From the 
evidence presented, parsimonious explanations based exclusively on changes in the balance of 
power within the international system cannot account for German foreign policies. Therefore, 
hypothesis one must be rejected. Similarly, evidence in support of an identity-based motive 
behind German foreign policy is almost entirely absent. With an appearance in the discourse only 













based on shared identity or opposition based on conflicting identities. Therefore, hypothesis five 
can also be rejected. 
In contrast to the lack of evidence of purely systemic imperatives, there is ample support 
for the suggestion that German policy makers considered a wide array of additional security 
interests such as energy security, shared interests, and regional security, when formulating 
responses to various issues. This discourse trailed only constructivist and multilateral speech in 
frequency. Neoclassical realist explanations reflect interest in factors that mitigate expected 
balancing or bandwagoning behavior, which appeared regularly and were highly salient across 
the years considered for this study due to prioritization of regional and energy security. At the 
same time, the related dialogue, while still notable during the conflict years, remained relatively 
the same, manifesting a basic continuity. While these issues remained salient to policy makers, 
given the consistency in both frequency and tone, attention to non-systemic security concerns 
cannot account for the different policy responses. Therefore, hypothesis two can be rejected. 
Language reflecting institutionalist considerations dominated most years and appeared 
prominently in the discourse during the conflict years, exceeded only by constructivist rhetoric in 
both 2008 and 2014. Moreover, as a percentage of the overall dialogue, appeals to 
multilateralism increased between these two years. This change points to greater emphasis on 
multilateral solutions with respect to Ukraine, which is contrary to predicted behavior. As 
discussed at the outset, a decrease in institutional discourse would account for the shift in policy 
from cooperation to confrontation.  Alternatively, an increase in cooperation would be expected 
to yield less coercive behavior over time.   
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As with the French case, the fact that an institutional approach contains both positive and 
negative components necessitates additional consideration.  A closer look at this explanation 
allows separating the components of this category and considering the individual themes to 
consider the impact of these factors on German decision makers. As noted above, multilateral 
discourse appeared noticeably more frequently in 2014 than in 2008. On the surface this might 
be easily explained by the simple fact that the crisis in Georgia lasted only a few months while 
that in Ukraine occurred throughout almost the entire year. While there was obviously more 
opportunity for German policy makers to comment on the latter situation, the specific issues 
contained in their statements reveals more about their thinking. Much of the rhetoric reflecting 
multilateral concern relates to issues other than Georgia or Ukraine. In 2008, only 4 out of 13 
texts pertain to the conflict in Georgia; the rest focus on topics such as regional security (separate 
from the Caucasus), energy, climate, and EU-Russia relations, specifically the renewing of the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. In 2014, slightly over half of the documents discuss the 
situation in Ukraine, with almost all of the remainder concerned with Iran or Syria.  
While the frequency of multilateral references may have changed, the nature or tone did 
not. The reactions of German foreign policy makers remained the same in each situation. In the 
statements related to the conflict in Georgia, the texts reveal a frustration with Russia’s failure to 
adhere to the terms of the Six Point Plan, more specifically, their failure to redeploy troops to 
previous positions. Subsequently, the rhetoric concerning Ukraine demonstrates a frustration 
with Russia’s failure to comply with a multilaterally-preferred solution. In this case, German 
policy makers continued to express disappointment with Russia’s unwillingness to halt the flow 
of heavy weapons to separatists. Considering the individual components of the multilateralist 
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perspective as well as the topics around which the discourse revolved reveals little difference 
between the frequency of multilateral discussions and, more significantly, no difference between 
the perspectives of the decision makers. Lacking a difference in dialogue between the two cases, 
the multilateralist perspective fails to account for change in policy decisions so hypothesis three 
can be rejected. 
On the contrary, liberal perspectives, do show a noticeable change. Trailing only rhetoric 
concerned with constructivist themes in 2008, discussions regarding the economy, 
interdependence, modernization, and partnership drops off during 2014, noticeably lagging 
behind other theoretical explanations. This change in salience of liberal perspectives conforms to 
the theoretical expectations since a decrease in these concerns would facilitate greater 
confrontation based on changes in domestic priorities. Rather than being subject to economic or 
other material concerns, policy would be the result of other preferences to which sanctions 
contributed or at least would not inhibit. As a result, hypothesis four cannot be rejected. 
As mentioned above, evidence from the conflict years reveals a predominant discourse 
based on international norms, as argued by the constructivist perspective and articulated in 
hypothesis five. While regularly present at low levels, this rhetoric replaces the typical focuses 
on state interests or institutional interactions following Russian interventions. At first glance, this 
fact appears to offer a satisfactory explanation based on the identification of a dominant 
discourse. Yet, the paucity of discourse prior to and its presence only subsequent to Russian 
interventions suggests that this is not a regular source of Russo-German interactions.  Moreover, 
similar discursive patterns are associated with opposite foreign policy behaviors, meaning 
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normative concerns by themselves cannot account for change in behavior.  Therefore, with no 
change in this independent variable, hypothesis 6 can be rejected. 
The final perspective under consideration is based on the democratic peace logic, which 
forms the basis of hypothesis seven. In general, discourse related to Russian democracy appears 
infrequently. As described above, in only two years, 2003 and 2005, under consideration did this 
topic represent at least 10% of German foreign policy statements concerning Russia. When 
looking at the years in which Russian interventions occur, dialogue on democracy appears twice 
in 2008 and only once in 2014. In the former, the discourse contains both support for and 
concern with Russian democracy while in the latter, only discussions reflecting concern appears. 
The paucity of rhetoric found in the conflict years directly addressing the state of democracy in 
Russia initially suggests that this hypothesis should also be rejected. However, expanding the 
aperture beyond the immediate timeframe surrounding the conflicts yields an informative picture 
of German foreign policy motivations as discussed below. 
In sum, the initial round of analysis suggests that several hypotheses based on norms, 
institutions, and structural considerations can be rejected based on the analysis only of conflict 
years. At the same time, two potential hypotheses—liberalist perspectives stemming from 
economic concerns and the democratic peace theory based on the perception of democracy in 
Russia—remain as potential explanations for the two German foreign policy decisions. 
Furthermore, looking at patterns over time also offers insight into the motivations behind actions 
taken in response to Russian interventions. Consequently, it is necessary to examine the data 
more closely.  
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Turning again to the case of liberalism reduces the differences between time periods.  As 
mentioned above, liberal themes decreased in frequency between 2008 and 2014.  However, 
splitting the year 2008 into pre- and post-conflict time periods permits a better understanding of 
German policy makers’ actions.  In the months prior to August, discourse reflecting liberal 
considerations appears as frequently as that related to the institutionalist perspective and is 
predominant.  However, following the war, other themes consistent with liberal arguments 
marked decrease trailing discussions associated with constructivist, neoclassical realist, and 
institutional explanations, a salience equal to that of 2014.  Therefore, between the two conflict 
periods there is no difference in liberal rhetoric.  Following Russian interventions, German 
speech manifested equal amounts of concern with issues emblematic of liberal assertions.  
Finally, I expand the investigation to include years beyond 2008 and 2014 to consider 
additional patterns in the data, specifically the German perception of Russian democracy. As 
discussed earlier, rhetoric reflecting rationalist perspectives (realism, institutionalism, and 
liberalism) ebb and flow over time but do not conform to theoretical expectations. At the same 
time, constructivist explanations based on normative concerns emerge in reaction to events and 
fail to demonstrate any regular influence on German foreign policy. However, looking at the 
pattern of discourse regarding the German considerations of the trajectory of Russian democracy, 
reveals a distinct difference between the years preceding and succeeding the Georgia conflict. 
More specifically, in the early years under consideration German policy makers made frequent 
positive reference to Russian democracy. However, beginning in 2009, only once did rhetoric in 
support of Russian appear and that at the same time as an expression of concern. In the following 
years, German policy makers neglect to make a single positive reference regarding Russian 
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democracy while consistently expressing concern about it. Borrowing from the liberal focus on 
modernization may reinforce this perspective as well. Since modernization includes both 
economic and political components which imply that modern institutions are western institutions, 
discourse promoting Russian modernization insinuates that such institutions do not yet exist. In 
other words, if German policy makers are emphasizing the need for improvements in the Russian 
political and economic spheres, then they are concerned with the current state or the progress in 
those areas. Looking at the course of rhetoric concerning modernization reveals another distinct 
pattern that matches the flow of democratic discourse. Through the year 2010, discourse related 
to modernization is minimal whereas beginning in that year, German policy makers frequently 
express a need for Russian modernization, inherently demonstrating a need for change in current 
institutions or a need for a change in trajectory of the course of reforms.  
When considering the range of theoretically-derived explanations for disparate foreign 
policy choices, it is not possible strictly to examine the dominant discourse. Rather it is 
necessary to determine which, if any, discourse changes over time and whether this change can 
account for changes in behavior. In the case of German reactions to Russian interventions in 
Georgia and Russia, the constructivist discourse dominates. However, given the continuity across 
cases, normative motivations cannot independently account for different policies. Likewise, 
institutionalist concerns, while relatively salient in the conflict years, remained the same. 
Furthermore, a liberal perspective, focused on discussions about economics, partnership, and 
modernization, failed to demonstrate sufficient change over time.  Ultimately, the discourse 
points only to explanations consistent with the democratic peace logic, which was manifest in a 
noticeable pattern from 2003 to 2014. 
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Conclusions 
Having looked at the French and German case studies individually, I will consider them together 
to draw some combined conclusions.  First, I briefly review the key aspects of this study, such as 
the motivating issue and theoretical explanations, after which I compare the separate findings 
and discuss how these relate to the theoretical gaps identified in chapter one.  I will end by 
further noting ways that these findings could be reconsidered and expanded. 
Reviewing the puzzle 
This study has been motivated by the observation of an empirical puzzle whereby France 
and Germany, in conjunction with their fellow EU countries, adopted opposite foreign policies 
when confronted with highly similar situations. More specifically, following the Russian 
intervention in Georgia in 2008, they chose not to sanction Russia, despite their objections to 
Russian actions. On the other hand, in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and material 
support for ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine, France and Germany supported the 
implementation of sanctions against Russia. While not identical, these situations provide a basis 
for comparing both states’ reactions over time to identify patterns in foreign policy decision 
making to reveal motivations behind French and German foreign policy. Admittedly, some 
differences appear significant, namely the difference in territorial size as well as economic 
activity. At the same time, both of the states represent former members of the Soviet Union 
whose orientations were shifting westward, a change that disturbed Russia. More importantly, 
the actions taken in response, namely, Russian military intervention in the territory of 
internationally recognized states without their permission, forms the primary impetus for action. 
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The question that emerges from these situations, then, is: why did France and Germany abstain 
from sanctions in 2008 but implement them in 2014? 
Methodology review 
As a basis for answering this question, I developed a number of plausible explanations based on 
prominent theories of international relations and/or foreign policy. The neorealist perspective 
suggests an explanation based on different changes in international structure between the cases, 
forcing these states to endeavor to restore balance through the implementation sanctions. From a 
neoclassical realist point of view emerged the possibility that mitigating domestic concerns 
declined across the years, removing obstacles to respond to systemic changes, allowing France 
and Germany to exhibit balancing behaviors. An institutionalist account inspired an account 
based on decreasing reliance on international institutions between cases, preventing all sides 
from arriving at a coordinated solution short of sanctioning in 2014. Liberal concerns with 
economics likewise indicate that the changes in foreign policy behavior stemmed from a 
decrease in economic interaction over time. Alternatively, a constructivist perspective based on 
adherence to international norms proposes that France and Germany interpreted Russian action 
in 2008 as more legitimate while finding their activities in 2014 in (more) serious violation of 
international expectations. Finally, an explanation founded on the democratic peace logic 
suggested that differences between French and German foreign policies were the result of a 
change in their assessment of Russia, treating it as a democracy in 2008 but as a non-democracy 
in 2014. Each of these theoretical explanations generated a testable hypothesis to be analyzed 
through discourse analysis of statements by each country’s foreign policy makers. 
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Conclusions compared 
The analysis of discourses of French and German politicians revealed similar bases on 
which each country interacted with Russia—a combination of bilateral and multilateral issues. 
Over time, each country sought to increase connections with Russia in economic, political, and 
cultural terms. In addition, as active, influential regional states, all three countries played a role 
in prominent international issues such as Iraq’s WMD program, Iran’s nuclear efforts, or the 
Israeli-Palestine conflict, as well as regional issues such as the independence of Kosovo and 
frozen conflicts in the Caucasus.  
In both cases, the empirical data manifested discourse related to each of the theoretical 
perspectives to a certain extent. Table eight summarizes the findings of both cases and compares 
them with the theoretically-derived explanations.  Comparing the findings between the two 
countries reveals additional similarities as well. Two sets of predominant discourses emerge in 
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— = N + N
Institutionalism — = N + N
Liberalism — = N = N
Constructivism — = N = N
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and 2014, interactions with Russia reflected institutionalist focus on multilateral cooperation. 
When dealing with international crises both countries demonstrate clear support for solutions that 
include Russia as a key contributor. This pattern changed however when responding to crises in 
which Russia was a primary actor, i.e., the conflicts examined in this study, first in Georgia, then 
in Ukraine. In response to these events, rhetoric displaying constructivist themes 
overwhelmingly dominated the discussions. Below these regularly dominant trends ran the 
current of discussions of democracy in Russia that never reached predominance but at times 
constituted a noticeable portion of the rhetoric. As with the previous rhetoric, both cases revealed 
a similar trend. Early references express support for the state and trajectory of Russian 
democracy but later discussions, when they appear at all, reveal concern toward Russian 
domestic politics. 
At the same time, some differences emerged between the two cases. From a neorealist 
perspective, French rhetoric regularly included discussions of power and polarity while these 
themes never appeared in German discourse. With respect to the related neoclassical realist 
approach, the texts reveal another albeit less significant difference. Themes associated with this 
theory appear frequently in each case and at times overtake others to become the dominant 
discourse but not with the same frequency. Neoclassical realist rhetoric appears as dominant 
discourse in three years in the Germany case—2005, 2009, and 2010—while it achieves this 
status only once in the France case, in 2009. This difference does not reflect too great a 
difference however since in both 2005 and 2010 neoclassical realist rhetoric appeared next most 
frequently to institutional discussions. Finally, evidence pertaining to liberal perspectives 
differed between the French and German cases. With respect to the former, these themes 
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consistently trailed most other themes and rarely manifested themselves after 2007. The latter 
case however reveals much greater emphasis although its importance relative to other discourse 
rises and falls over time without showing any clear pattern. 
Despite these divergent findings, the discourse reveals an even greater harmony with 
regard to the analysis of the various hypotheses considered. Ultimately, the texts demonstrate 
support only for the democratic peace hypothesis in both instances, despite minimal salience 
over time. Normative explanations, while overwhelming dominant in both cases, fail to offer an 
independent explanation because there was no change in the emphasis between 2008 and 2014. 
Similarly, institutional perspectives cannot explain changes in foreign policy behaviors despite 
regular, frequent references to the need for multilateral problem-solving because of a lack of 
change between the cases. Neither does either variant of realism offer a satisfactory explanation, 
albeit for different reasons between cases. In the German case, I found no change over time. In 
the French case, both perspectives demonstrated change over time but in ways contrary to 
theoretical explanations. Finally, a liberal interpretation also fails to indicate a distinction over 
time in both cases. Only an explanation founded on the expectations that democracies behave in 
distinctly different ways toward other democracies than non-democracies finds support in French 
and German foreign policy discourse. 
It is important to acknowledge that this study does not specifically account for all 
potential influences on foreign policies.  For instance, during the period under consideration, 
Europe experienced what has been called the “great recession” or the financial crisis.  As 
evidenced above, this topic never emerged as an issue upon which relations with Russia were 
founded.  While this clearly occupied that attention of decision makers in European countries, it 
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is unclear to what extent these factors impacted relations between France and Germany and 
Russia.  Looking at the GDP data incident to the crises fails to offer a clear distinction between 
cases but rather shows similar economic performance in the countries in the quarters that lead up 
to events in Georgia and Ukraine.  In 2008, France and Germany experience both growth as well 
as contraction in GDP (OECD, 2016a).  The economy of the former grew 0.35% in the first 
quarter but receded by 0.47% in the second quarter.  Similarly, the German economy grew by 
0.85% in the first quarter while declining by .26% in the second.  At the same time, the third 
quart of 2008 again led to negative growth in GDPs for these countries (-0.29% and -0.37%, 
respectively), making it clear that their economies were in trouble.  By the time of the Georgia 
crisis in that year, the outlook for both these economies was negative (Dominguez and Shapiro, 
2013).  In the following years, these countries experienced similar changes although at different 
times.  The first two quarters of 2014, the French economy contracted by .04% in the first quarter 
but increased by 0.13% in the second.  Conversely, the German economy grew in the first quarter 
by 0.72% before declining by 0.06% in the second quarter.  By the third quarter, both economies 
had experienced growth again.  Moreover, the overall expectation at the beginning of the year 
was for continued economic growth in both countries, at 0.6% for France and 1.6% for Germany 
(OECD, 2016b).  These data portray distinctions between the two time periods—i.e., both the 
trajectory of economic activity and the overall economic outlook differed between 2008 and 
2014. 
Incorporating the approach outlined at the beginning of this paper, it is plausible to 
articulate an explanation based on the impact of the global financial crisis and European 
recession.  Specifically, in 2008, this argument would suggest that France and Germany were in 
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the midst of economic contraction and wanted to avoid costly foreign policies.  Given that 
sanctions hurt both the sender and the target countries, France and Germany were reluctant to 
further damage already hurting economies.  Alternatively, this perspective implies that by 2014 
French and German economies had recovered and policy makers no longer feared the downward 
effects on growth from sanctions, allowing them to support EU sanctions.   
This paper does not specifically investigate such assertions so these concerns cannot 
immediately be evaluated.  Furthermore, the data gathered in support of this paper are 
insufficient to answer the question directly.  Additional textual sources such as parliamentary 
debates, party manifestos or statements by business leaders should be examined in an effort to 
discern discourse related to this particular hypothesis.  At the same time, this possibility is 
reflective of liberal arguments founded on the priority of economics in foreign policy making, 
which I found not to be determinative.  Ultimately, I conclude that although the economic crisis 
consumed significant attention and may have impacted the foreign policies of France and 
Germany, the initial findings suggest that this is not the case.  However, given the initial 
empirical support, this explanation may merit future independent consideration. 
Broader implications 
First, this study finds support for the assertion that democratic peace logic applies to 
cases beyond war and peace and includes other types of coercive behavior such as economic 
sanctions.  Democratic states such as France and Germany refrain from pursuing foreign policies 
that impose costs on the target state that is seen as a democracy or progressing toward western-
style, liberal democracy.  Instead, they seek alternate solutions that emphasize the benefits of the 
target’s changing its policy.  However, when interacting with a non-democracy, states are willing 
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to take a confrontational stand and employ coercive means to get another country to change its 
behavior.  These findings do not suggest, however, that other concerns do not matter to foreign 
policy decision makers.  The rhetoric clearly reflects that leaders pay significant attention to both 
norms and material interests.  In both cases the discourse reveals a predominant concern with 
issues of international law, sovereignty, and territorial integrity in reaction to Russian 
interventions.  Similarly, policy makers expressed an interest in coordinating policy through 
institutional mechanisms, particularly via informal multilateral consensus and compromise.  
Regardless of these motivations, when approached with a decision on cooperation versus 
conflict, democratic policy makers take into account the form of regime in the target state and 
adopt distinctly different policies in response. 
At the same time, the findings related to democratic peace remain limited because the 
current analysis fails to address causal mechanisms behind the relationship between domestic 
political institutions and foreign policy.  Several explanations have been suggested for the 
democratic peace both from rationalist and constructivist perspectives but the data considered 
herein does not necessarily support one argument over the other.  Nevertheless, the 
overwhelming presence of constructivist themes in the rhetoric surrounding the conflicts points 
to a correlation between normative factors and democratic decision making.     
As much as these findings reveal about French and German foreign policy, their 
implications are not limited to the specific cases involved. Stepping back to examine broader 
theoretical questions, the conclusions from cases provide insight into two gaps identified at the 
beginning, namely perceptions and democratization. As argued in the findings of both case 
studies, revisions in the views of policy makers toward the state of democracy in Russia, from 
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positive to negative, led to changes in policy from cooperation to confrontation, as predicted by 
democratic peace theory. However, this change is not based on an objective measure of 
democracy such as the existence of specific political institutions or individual freedoms as 
reflected in the typical measures of democracy. On the contrary, these rankings did not change 
between 2008 and 2014. Freedom House assigned Russia a score of 5.5 out of 10, which put 
Russia in the category of “not free.” Similarly, the Polity IV project evaluated Russia as a 4 out 
of 10, classifying it as an “anocracy ,” which is a middle category between autocracy and 14
democracy. In other words, in quantifiable terms, Russia was no more or less democratic one 
case than the other. However, as the discourse reveals, policy makers perceived a difference in 
Russia, which resulted in different behaviors, which supports Owen’s (1994) findings that a 
democracy’s perceptions of the other state matter. Specifically, these findings suggest that the 
range of states toward which democracies may act according to democratic peace logic may be 
greater than that normally considered in purely quantitative analyses. Alternatively, the number 
and types of states that democracies treat as non-democracies may also be greater than 
anticipated. Applying these conclusions to studies of the democratic peace presents a 
methodological challenge to quantitative analyses due to the difficulty in measuring one state’s 
perceptions of another. Unless such a factor can be found, future research to further investigate 
the effect of perceptions would have to rely on qualitative studies.  
 According to the Global Report 2014 an anocracy “is characterized by institutions and political elites 14
that are far less capable of performing fundamental tasks and ensuring their own continuity. Anocratic 
regimes very often reflect inherent qualities of instability or ineffectiveness and are especially vulnerable 
to the onset of new political instability events, such as outbreaks of armed conflict, unexpected changes in 
leadership, or adverse regime changes (e.g., a seizure of power by a personalistic or military leader). 
Anocracies are a middling category rather than a distinct form of governance. They are countries whose 
governments are neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic but, rather, combine an often incoherent mix 
of democratic and autocratic traits and practices.” (Center for Systemic Peace, 2014: 19)
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The findings that perceptions influence foreign policy extend beyond democratic peace 
explanations.  The specific policies considered in this research suggest that such logic accounts 
for French and German reactions but this fact does not limit conclusions concerning perceptions 
to this point of view.  Considering the range of theories employed to account for foreign policy 
decisions, perceptions could perform a role in any of them.  From a realist perspective, leaders 
may make decisions based on perceived rather than actual changes in system structure.  
Specifically, one country may view another as having increased in capabilities, whether material 
or economic, when in fact it has not resulting in balancing activities that are not merited based on 
‘objective’ factors.  Both balance of threat and neoclassical realist understandings already 
account for this possibility in their considerations of a state’s aggressiveness or assessment of 
intentions, respectively.  Institutional considerations are likewise amenable to the impact of 
perceptions based on leaders view of the effectiveness of international institutions.  For example, 
an important aspect of this perspective is the influence of the ‘shadow of the future’ which 
encourages states to abide by international rules or norms.  This consideration however relies on 
decision makers’ abilities to interpret the likelihood of other states’ willingness to comply in the 
future, which is inherently perceptual.  Clearly, a systemic constructivist viewpoint appreciate 
the importance of leaders’ interpretation of their environment. As mentioned above, the cases 
considered provide tentative support for democratic peace founded on normative considerations.  
At the same time, other normative explanations may also be open to the inclusion of perceptions.  
Similar to interpretations of democracy, a country’s understanding of another’s compliance with 
any international norm may not be entirely founded on objective measures but rather may depend 
on interpretations of policy makers.  Therefore, while the findings above are founded on 
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democratic peace considerations, they open up the possibility that alternative explanations may 
also incorporate leaders’ views of a variety of aspects of target states when making decisions. 
In conjunction with the findings regarding the influence of leaders’ assessment of other 
states, the results of this study highlight the possibility that foreign policy makers also assess the 
direction of movement or trajectory of democracy in a target state. As seen above, French and 
German policy makers did not assess Russia to be a full-fledged, western-style democracy but 
rather a country that was unequivocally on its way toward becoming one. While some decision 
makers (Schroeder 2003) strenuously endorsed Russian democracy, western leaders in the early 
years examined in this study more often highlighted Russia’s progress and praised the extent to 
which their system had democratized since the demise of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the 
little data that emerged in latter years showed dissatisfaction with the progress of Russian 
democracy. As another contribution to refining the democratic peace theory, the findings above 
suggest that democratic trajectory in a country is a factor, as an input to leaders’ perceptions, in 
the behavior of democracies toward other states. By itself, analysis of democratization or decline 
toward authoritarianism is less problematic than perceptions by itself. Research using measures 
of democratization are easy to find. However, when combined with the idea of perceptions, the 
problems confronted by qualitative analyses return. 
Future considerations 
While the case studies considered for this dissertation provide insight into French and German 
policies specifically and relate to democratic peace more broadly, additional research is 
necessary to bolster the claims made with respect to democratization and perceptions. First, the 
initial findings from these case studies could be reconsidered using additional qualitative data as 
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well.  Referring back to Fetzer’s (2013) categories of political discourse, I included no references 
from the category of ‘politics from below’ which consists of rhetoric from those outside of 
government to include opposition parties, think tanks, and interest groups. Similarly, conducting 
structured interviews with those involved in policy making would also provide a rich source of 
data.  Incorporating data from these sources would open up the possibility of examining 
interactions between decision makers and others, which would provide insight into several of the 
theoretical perspectives, especially neoclassical realist and liberal points of view.   
Another avenue for additional consideration is to examine other EU member states and 
consider their reactions to Russian interventions. Especially helpful would be other mature, 
western democracies that differ from France and Germany in significant ways or eastern 
European states which may provide insight into the role of the EU and influence of larger states. 
Alternatively, investigation of the reactions of democracies outside the EU such as the US, 
Canada, or Japan may shed additional light on the subject. Finally, one could consider French 
and German reactions to other states in or potentially in transition to democracy such as Iran 
whom the EU had also sanctioned.  More significantly, this study should be augmented to 
investigate the sources of democratic foreign policy.  In other words, the support for the 
democratic peace logic can be expanded to consider either rationalist or normative foundations 
behind the policies.  As just mentioned, this would require additional data sources that would 
provide evidence for explanations such as those based on audience costs, signaling, or other 
institutional factors.  Information on public opinion and/or opposition party perspectives for 
example. 
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Finally, this research obviously informs additional considerations of the impact of 
perceptions.  As noted earlier, many different theoretical accounts may be subject to the influence 
of decision makers’ interpretation of their environment.  While the preceding examination 
superimposes this factor on the democratic peace logic, explanations based on rationalist, 
idealist, and constructivist perspectives are all subject to the suggestion that leaders rely on a 
variety of decision making faculties.    Furthermore, the effect of perceptions could be 
incorporated into research into various stages of conflict.  My research focused on state reactions 
to military interventions into a third states territory and supports explanations based on the 
democratic peace logic.  This approach focuses on the lack of confrontational responses between 
democratic regimes, either in the form of military conflict or other coercive actions such as 
sanctions.  A variety of models exist describing the progression of conflict from the US Institute 
for Peace’s (2016) conception of three phases to Alker, Gurr, and Rupesinghe’s description of six 
stages (2001). The implications of both the democratic peace logic, regime trajectory, as well as 
the influence of perceptions could be extended to research across the evolution of conflicts, such 
as conflict prevention, management, and resolution.  For example, studies related to 
democratization as a means of conflict resolution (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, 2007) may 
benefit from the consideration of perceptions.  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